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ABSTRACT 
 
INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF STUDENT OPT OUT ON 
VALUE-ADDED MEASURES OF TEACHER QUALITY 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2017 
 
JOSHUA J. MARLAND, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
 
A.M., BROWN UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Stephen G. Sireci 
 
 
Student assessment nonparticipation (or opt out) has increased substantially in K-
12 schools in states across the country. This increase in opt out has the potential to impact 
achievement and growth measures used for educator and institutional accountability. This 
simulation study investigates the extent to which value-added measures of teacher quality 
are impacted as a result of varying degrees of opt out, as well as various types of 
nonrandom opt out. Results show that the magnitude of opt out has a greater impact on 
stability of value-added estimates than the type of nonrandom opt out patterns simulated 
in this study, with root mean square differences in value-added estimates and standard 
errors increasing as the magnitude increased. In addition, classification agreement 
decreased as magnitude increased. Finally, one type of opt out, where the highest 
achieving students in the highest achieving classrooms did not participate, appeared to 
have more of an impact on stability than the other types of opt out in this study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Students choosing to not participate in annual summative assessments (hereafter 
“opting out”) is a relatively new phenomenon in United States K-12 education, with 
substantial increases in some states and districts over the past several years. Student 
participation in assessments has important implications: the scores are used for a host of 
instructional and accountability purposes, including student grade promotion or 
graduation, and for accountability for teachers, schools, districts and states.   
Much of the literature related to opting out of assessments is based on recent news 
reports or press releases about which students were expected to participate in 
assessments, and who ultimately did. Reports about the characteristics of students who 
opt out differ across localities, with some states or districts finding that wealthy, higher-
achieving students opt out, such as in Oregon, while New York education officials 
reported that lower-achieving students in relatively wealthy districts were slightly more 
likely to opt out. There has also been news coverage of the reasons for which people 
support the right to opt out. Some reports show that opt out activists oppose the more 
difficult consortia assessments, or that they do not support evaluating teachers or schools 
based on the results (Pizmony‐Levy & Green Saraisky (2016). Opting out of a state 
assessment can have implications for many within the education community who rely on 
assessment results for decision-making purposes. 
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1.1.1 Federal Participation Requirements 
 
Under Section 1111(2)(I)(ii) of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, the United 
States Department of Education (USDE) required that 95 percent of eligible students 
participate in the grades 3-8 assessments for English Language Arts (ELA) and Math at 
the aggregate and subgroup levels. This means that 95 percent of all eligible students 
were required to participate, as well as 95 percent within each of the federally-protected 
subgroups, such as English language learners or students with disabilities. Overall and 
subgroup participation rates were calculated at the school, district, and state levels. Not 
included in participation rate calculations were the approximately one percent of students 
with the most significant cognitive disabilities, as long as these students took the state's 
alternate assessment. As noted in policy guidance from the USDE in 2013, these 
participation requirements have historically been enforced by the USDE, with states 
providing regular retake opportunities for absent students (USDE, 2013). The Institute of 
Education Sciences (IES) found in 2007 that less than one percent of schools did not 
make their accountability targets because of the participation rate requirement.    
State education agencies missing their 95 percent participation rate requirement 
can face sanctions such as a formal request to comply, a cease-and-desist order, or the 
withholding or suspending of Title I funds that are meant to support low-income students 
(Camera, 2015). States are not necessarily required to meet a 95 percent participation rate 
if they do not receive Title I dollars, which is a major policy lever for USDE. Under the 
new Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) passed in 2015, states are now required to 
factor low-participation rates into school-level accountability ratings, and to have some 
level of discretion over how they do so (Ujifusa, 2015). Perhaps in preparation for this 
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change, the USDE sent letters to 12 states to ensure that they had a plan to address low-
participation rates in the assessment at the state, district, or subgroup levels (Klein, 2015). 
According to unverified media reports by the National Center for Fair and Open 
Testing (hereafter FairTest) (2015), at least 14 states had non-negligible numbers of 
students who chose to opt-out in 2014-15, ranging from approximately 4,600 in 
Pennsylvania to 240,000 in New York, the latter being the focus of this study. FairTest, 
along with other organizations, had been advocating for students to opt-out of the newly-
implemented national consortium assessments because some believe they are perceived 
as more difficult than previous assessments, thus leaving students and teachers uncertain 
about how they will perform (Clark, 2015). 
1.1.2 Understanding Federal Testing Requirements 
 
One clear effect of opting out is on participation rates in the state assessment. As 
mentioned, the participation rate requirements for states set by the USDE in 2001 under 
the reauthorization of NCLB is 95 percent of all eligible students, including for each 
federally-protected subgroup (No Child Left Behind Act, 2002). Less clear is the impact 
that opt out can have on achievement status and growth or value-added measures that 
states calculate using student assessment scores. The primary goal of NCLB was to have 
all students, regardless of background, reach the proficient level as defined by each state, 
by the year 2014 (No Child Left Behind Act, 2002).  
As part of their NCLB requirements, states calculated the percent of students in 
each performance level, as well as the change in percent of students who attained the 
proficient level across years, for accountability purposes. The percent of students 
reaching proficiency in the “All Students” group, as well as for each subgroup, in ELA 
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and Math was considered the status measure, while the change in percent proficient in the 
same subjects between two years was used as a progress measure (termed Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP)) under NCLB.  Through the combination of these two measures, 
schools were held responsible for improving student performance until all students 
reached the proficient performance level on the state assessment (No Child Left Behind 
Act, 2002). As mentioned, missing the participation requirement can mean that a school, 
district or state fails to meet AYP overall, even if they meet their proficiency targets.  
As part of the 2010 Race to the Top (RttT) competition, and the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) waivers in 2012, the federal government expanded its 
focus from school and district accountability to include teacher accountability by 
requiring that states incorporate measures of student learning into teacher evaluation 
systems. Most states that participated in RttT or that subsequently received an ESEA 
waiver chose growth or value-added measures that purported to represent the extent to 
which students in a classroom grew in an academic year. In reality, these measures are 
the result of conditional status change calculations, which represent the extent to which a 
student and/or classroom changed in the distribution of similar students or teachers 
(Castellano & Ho, 2013). This change was then attributed to teachers for evaluation 
purposes. Additional information about these methodologies is provided in Section 2.6. 
Using these conditional status change measures, rather than achievement status 
measures, to evaluate teachers was intended to address concerns that teachers of low-
achieving students could never be considered effective because their students would have 
difficulty reaching proficiency in a given year. Theoretically, because these growth and 
value-added models compare students to other similar students, and/or similar classrooms 
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to each other, teachers with high concentrations of lower-achieving students could 
perform well relative to other teachers of lower-achieving students, even though their 
students did not reach proficiency. However, Newton et al (2010) found that, even after 
controlling for student-level characteristics, teachers with high concentrations of high-
need students tended to receive lower value-added scores with correlations of 
approximately -0.2 to -0.5.  On the flip side, higher concentrations of Asian students and 
higher levels of parental education were positively correlated with higher value-added 
estimates. In New York, however, the correlation between demographic characteristics 
and value-added estimates has been close to zero, perhaps because they included student-
level, as well as classroom-level averages for the same characteristics, as covariates in 
their model (NYSED, 2015).   
The comparative nature of these value-added models creates a situation in which 
student opt out can influence both the accuracy and stability of teacher evaluation 
measures, depending on several factors, such as the magnitude of opt out and whether opt 
out patterns are considered to be nonrandom. Random opt out in large numbers could 
affect the standard errors of any measure created with student assessments because fewer 
students are likely included in the calculations. Value-added measures typically only 
include the students in a teacher’s classroom for that year, which is roughly 30 or fewer 
students in a given elementary classroom. To contextualize this number, most states do 
not calculate results for subgroups with fewer than 30 students because of the instability 
of the measures with so few observations. Given USDE’s stance on the stability of 
measures with fewer than 30 students in a group, it is safe to say that the number of 
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students included in value-added estimates is already relatively low for stability 
standards. 
Nonrandomness driven by student-level characteristics may affect the accuracy of 
teachers with large concentrations of a characteristic. For instance, teacher value-added 
measures could be biased up or down if all English language learners chose to opt out of 
the assessment, depending on how systematically different their performance is as a 
group from other students taking the assessment. Nonrandomness driven by classroom-, 
school-, or district-level characteristics could impact measures created for each level as 
well. For instance, value-added estimates could be biased if all higher-achieving students 
concentrated in certain classrooms opt out of the assessment, because this essentially 
removes the upper end of the distribution of test takers. This would not only affect these 
teachers, but would also likely impact teachers with no students choosing to opt-out, 
because of the comparative nature of the value-added methodology.  
This study investigates the impact of nonrandom opt out on student achievement-
based value-added measures used for evaluating teachers. Using simulated data generated 
from real results from one state, I vary the magnitude of opt out in teachers’ classrooms, 
as well as in the overall sample, to determine the impact on reliability and stability of 
teacher evaluation measures. I then vary the nonrandomness of opt out by relating it to 
prior achievement in classrooms to determine the impact on teacher evaluation measures 
for those with and without opt-out students. Finally, I also vary the interaction between 
magnitude of opt out and nonrandomness to fully investigate the issue.  
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 First, I provide more background on opt out trends in states around the country, 
then provide a missing data framework in which to situate student opt out, as both are 
important for understanding how patterns could affect value-added methodologies.  
1.1.3 Opt Out in the United States 
 
Rowland-Woods, Wixom, and Aragon (2015) reported that states have in some ways 
begun to address opt out, either through official statements from state chief school 
officers advocating that students not opt out, or through tougher laws making it more 
difficult for students to do so. Some states, like Texas, have an existing law that explicitly 
does not allow students to opt out of assessments. As described below, however, some 
state legislatures have advocated for students' rights to opt out, such as in Oregon, 
Delaware, and New Jersey.  
Oregon Department of Education officials reported that approximately five 
percent of students opted-out in 2014-15, most of whom were non-disabled white 
students who traditionally perform well on the assessment (Hammond, 2015). After the 
2015 assessment administration ended, Governor Kate Brown urged districts to work 
with parents to stress the importance of assessments and the potential implications of 
low-participation rates, while at the same time she signed a bill requiring districts to 
notify parents twice a year of their right to not participate in the state assessment (Ujifusa, 
2015). This bill also created two school ratings systems, one of which penalizes schools 
for low-participation rates, while the other does not.  
In Delaware, 10 percent of high school juniors did not participate in the 
assessment in the 2014-15 school year statewide (Albright, 2015). A bill designed to 
allow students to opt-out of the state assessment was vetoed by the governor, even after 
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gaining support from the Delaware Teachers' Union and the State House of 
Representatives. In New Jersey, where the percent of students opting-out was reportedly 
just under 10 percent, a bill was introduced in the state legislature that would allow 
parents to provide written notice to the school that their child would not be sitting for the 
assessment (Walker, 2015). The bill, however, was not considered when the senate acted 
on other legislation related to the state's participation in Partnership for Assessment of 
Readiness for College and Career (hereafter PARCC) assessments (Clark, 2015). 
In 2013, as opt out momentum grew across the state, New York State Education 
Department (NYSED) officials issued guidance to superintendents and principals of all 
public schools stating that there was no statute or regulation specifically related to allow 
students to opt-out of the assessment (Katz, 2013). In the guidance, NYSED officials 
stated that taking state assessments is considered part of the “course of study,” and that 
opting out could negatively impact their child's school or district accountability standing. 
According to media reports cited by NYSED, the percentage of students statewide 
choosing to opt out from the New York state assessment was at its highest level ever in 
2014-15, at approximately 20 percent, with estimates as high as 90 percent in some 
districts on Long Island and in the eastern part of the state (NYSED, 2015). This 
represented approximately 240,000 fewer students taking the Grade 3-8 assessments in 
ELA and Math. According to NYSED, opt-out students statewide were more likely to 
come from average or low-need districts, and were more likely to receive scores in the 
lowest two achievement levels in ELA or Math (NYSED, 2015). Rice, Marland and 
Meyer (2016) found that lower-achieving students, based on prior achievement scores, in 
higher-achieving districts were more likely to opt out in their analysis of 28 districts in 
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New York. In addition, there was variance across districts in the types of students who 
were more likely to opt out. Higher-achieving students were more likely to opt out in 
some districts, while lower-achieving ones did in others. NYSED, like many state 
education agencies, use assessment scores for a host of accountability purposes, including 
status and growth measures. As mentioned, both measures can be affected by large 
proportions of student opt out, which we discuss next.  
1.1.4 Missing Data Framework 
 
A large proportion of students opting out represents itself as a missing data 
challenge in statistical calculations, like the ones performed for creating value-added 
estimates of teacher quality. In the statistical literature, Rubin (1987) provides a 
framework for how to evaluate both the pattern and mechanism for missingness. The 
pattern refers to which data are missing from the analysis, such as randomly across the set 
of variables used in analysis, which is often how missing data are regarded in the 
calculation of value-added estimates. Students with missing data might be dichotomously 
coded as 1 (missing) or 0 (not missing), or students with a current assessment score are 
dropped from the analysis, so that complete case analysis can be performed.  
Because of the large proportion of students opting out in 2014-15, we must now 
consider other patterns to better understand the extent to which missing data impact 
value-added estimates. A common missing data pattern from Rubin (1987) is the 
univariate pattern, where respondents are missing data for only one variable. We might 
consider this to be the case in 2014-15, where, for the most part, students are only 
missing the most recent assessment score used for value-added estimation. A second 
missing data pattern would be the multivariate two pattern, where data are missing for the 
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same respondents on subsequent measures. This could be the case in 2015-16 if the exact 
same students opt out of the assessment this year as last year. The last common data 
pattern is when we have fewer respondents at each subsequent measurement opportunity, 
such as if opt out continues to grow with fewer students taking the assessment every year.  
The other consideration with missing data is the mechanism by which the pattern 
was created, which is often referred to as one of three categories: missing completely at 
random, missing at random, and missing not at random (Schafer & Graham, 2002; Rubin, 
1987). Each pattern represents a potentially different relationship between the distribution 
of observable characteristics and missing data, and the reasons for which the data are 
missing. Each mechanism can differentially affect statistical indices often used for 
evaluating the quality of a measure – in particular, the reliability and precision of the 
measure, which in this case are value-added estimates of teacher quality (Schafer & 
Graham, 2002). Figures 1-3 below help to organize each of the missing data mechanisms 
into a framework, while focusing on the univariate pattern where we have only one 
missing data element.  
1.1.4.1 Missing completely at random (MCAR) 
 
This can be interpreted to mean that opt out patterns are totally random on observable 
characteristics, are unrelated to the outcome of interest and with the reason for being 
missing. This might be represented by similar proportions of students of all demographic 
groups and/or prior performance categories deciding not to participate in the assessment 
in 2014-15.  
In Figure 1, I begin laying out a framework for organizing the relationship among 
student characteristic and achievement with their reasons for opting out of the assessment 
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and whether they do, in fact, opt out.  In the figure, we see that student characteristics, 
such as prior achievement or demographics, are related to student achievement in the 
current year. We also see that the reason for opting out of the state assessment is related 
to opting out. However, there is no relationship between student characteristics or current 
achievement and whether a student chooses to opt out.  
1.1.4.2 Missing at random (MAR)  
 
Missing at random can be interpreted as data that may be missing on observable 
characteristics, such as demographics, and may be related to opt out, but a student’s 
reason for opting out is unrelated to the missing data (student achievement in the current 
year). For instance, we might see that English Learners (ELs) are less likely to participate 
in the assessment, but their current achievement (the outcome measure) spans all 
performance level categories.  
In Figure 2, we see that the two previous relationships persist (student 
characteristics with current achievement and the reason for opting out with doing so), 
however we now relate student characteristics with opt out. This is meant to represent the 
fact that characteristics may be related to opting out, but there still does not appear to be a 
relationship between the missing data and whether students opt out.  
1.1.4.3 Missing not at random (MNAR) 
 
Missing not at random builds on the previous two patterns, where the relationship 
between observables and opt out persists, but there is now a relationship between current 
student achievement (missing data) and opt out. In this case, we know some 
characteristics that are related to the reasons student do not to participate in the 
assessment, and they do, in fact, not participate. For instance, as NYSED reports, 
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wealthy, white students who were lower achieving in 2014 were more likely to opt-out of 
the assessment in 2015.  In Figure 3, we now relate current student achievement to 
student opt out, which makes the relationship nonrandom. I should note here that I am not 
relating student characteristics to the reasons for student opt out because we cannot argue 
that because a student is white or high-achieving that they chose to opt out. We can only 
state that: 
1. Student characteristics are related to student achievement. 
2. Student reasons for opting out are related to whether they do opt out 
3. Missingness in current student achievement is related to whether students 
choose to opt out.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
Student assessment opt out poses several challenges to the educational 
community, who are reliant on test scores for a host of purposes. The most obvious 
challenge is that teachers, principals, and policymakers are unable to make inferences 
about the status of achievement for students who choose to opt out. This is the primary 
purpose of summative annual assessments. A secondary, more recently-developed 
purpose of annual assessments is to use the results for evaluating teachers as one measure 
in multiple measure systems. While some disagree that evaluating teachers using student 
scores should be done at all, the practice persists across the nation, and likely will 
continue into the foreseeable future.  
To date, very few studies have considered the extent to which opt out patterns and 
mechanisms can impact value-added estimates. Researchers have typically considered all 
missing data to be MCAR or MAR, thus ignoring the issue. The magnitude of opt out in 
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New York and other states necessitates thoughtful investigation into exactly how much, 
and which, statistical indices are impacted by nonrandom missingness of student scale 
scores.  
1.3 Significance of the Problem 
 
 As mentioned, teachers are being evaluated using multiple measures, one of 
which is value-added or growth estimates. Many states use the results of evaluations for 
high-stakes decisions, such as hiring, firing, and promotion. To make sound decisions, 
value-added estimates should, at a minimum, be reliable and precise measures of what 
they purport to measure. A large degree of nonrandom opt out poses a threat to both 
indices, thereby threatening the utility of the measures in evaluation systems. In this 
study, I consider various scenarios for opt out that I believe to represent realistic opt out 
patterns in several states.  
1.4 Purpose of Study 
 
The purpose of the current study is to consider the extent to which teacher value-
added estimates are impacted by the magnitude of opt out patterns, as well as by the 
relationship between opt out and prior achievement. 
1. What is the impact of opt out on value-added measures? 
a. How does opt out in different magnitudes within a teacher’s classroom 
impact value-added measures?  
b. How does varying degrees of relationship between opt out patterns and 
prior achievement impact value-added measures?   
2. What is the impact of opt out on classification of teachers value-added estimates 
using realistic classification systems? 
14 
 
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
 
In 2001, Congress passed the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, which was a 
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. The 
reauthorization was a departure from existing state assessment and reporting practices in 
several ways, the first of which was that it included a requirement that schools make 
academic progress with all groups of students in all schools, including schools not 
receiving Title I funds for low-income students. The primary goal of NCLB was to have 
all students, regardless of background, reach the proficient level as defined by each state 
by the year 2014 (No Child Left Behind Act, 2002).  
As part of their NCLB requirements for accountability purposes, states calculated 
the percent of students in each performance level, as well as the change in percent of 
students who attained the proficient level across years. The percent of students reaching 
proficiency in the “All Students” group, as well as for each subgroup, in ELA and Math 
was considered the status measure, while the change in percent proficient in the same 
subjects between two years was used as a progress measure (termed Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP)) under NCLB.  Through the combination of these two measures, schools 
were held responsible for improving student performance until all students reached the 
proficient performance level on the state assessment (NCLB, 2002).  
States were also required to report results for each of nine subgroups, including 
students who were economically disadvantaged, part of a major racial or ethnic group, or 
English learners, or who had a disability (NCLB, 2002). Under the Improving All 
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Schools Act (IASA) of 1994, states were only required to make and report progress for 
all students in schools receiving Title I funding from the U.S. Department of Education 
(Redfield & Sheinker, 2004). Reporting progress for all students effectively meant that 
states did not have to disaggregate results for reporting on subgroups of students.   
Another new requirement under NCLB was annual testing of at least 95 percent 
of eligible students in all grades 3-8, and at least once in grades 10-12, in English 
Language Arts and Math (Redfield & Sheinker, 2004). Under IASA, states were required 
to assess students annually in one grade in each of three grade spans (Grades 3 – 5; 
Grades 6 – 8; Grades 10 – 12), but the act did not include a participation rate requirement 
like in NCLB.  
2.1.1 Identification for Improvement 
 
Schools, districts, and states could be identified for improvement if they failed to 
make adequate progress with any subgroup of students or the “All Students” group, for 
those not yet at the proficient level on the state assessment.  These groups could also be 
identified for improvement if the participation rate for any subgroup or for the “All 
Students” group was below the 95 percent requirement, which made ensuring 
participation in the assessment as important as ensuring students were able to meet grade-
level standards. However, most schools found it much more difficult to meet their AYP 
proficiency targets than the participation requirement (Institute of Education Sciences 
(IES), 2007). 
According to the IES report, 75 percent of schools met their AYP targets for the 
2004-05 school year (IES, 2007). For the 25 percent of schools that did not make AYP 
targets, 43 percent missed for the “All Students” group, 19 percent missed for two or 
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more subgroups of students, 21 percent missed because of one subgroup, 3 percent 
missed because of the participation rate requirement, and 14 percent missed for some 
other reason. This 3 percent of schools that failed to meet because of participation rates 
translates to less than 1 percent of all schools, which means that schools have historically 
not had an issue with meeting this particular requirement.  
2.1.2 Assessment Exemptions 
 
Under both IASA and NCLB, states were encouraged to utilize universal design 
principles in developing their assessments so that as many students as possible could 
participate with or without testing accommodations (Redfield & Scheinker, 2004).  While 
full inclusion was the aim, students with the most significant learning differences where 
accommodations still did not meet their needs were allowed to not participate in the 
general assessment. In these cases, states were allowed to administer an alternate 
assessment of alternate achievement standards to as many students as they deemed 
necessary, but were subject to what was called the “1 percent rule”. Elledge et al (2009) 
wrote that the “1 percent rule” allows for 1 percent of students in a state or district who 
score at proficient or above on the alternate assessment to be counted as proficient in the 
district’s or state’s AYP calculations. One percent can be 1 percent of all students or 10 
percent of students with special needs. USDE also issued interim policy options that 
would allow up to 2 percent of all students to be counted toward AYP targets, as long as 
students met proficient or advanced standards on an assessment of modified grade-level 
achievement standards. This could be 20 percent of students with disabilities or 2 percent 
of all students.  
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The National Center on Education Outcomes (NCEO) found in their 2005 
analysis of 21 states that the percent of special education students participating in the 
general assessment ranged from 78 percent in Connecticut to 100 percent in New 
Hampshire. Cameto et al (2009) report that the proportion of students participating in the 
alternate assessment has been as high as 15 percent in some states, for example. Elledge 
et al (2009) also wrote that in 2004-05 almost all states met the 95 participation rate 
requirement for students with disabilities, with 45 states meeting the goal in reading and 
46 in Math. In addition, more than 80 percent of states reported that more than 90 percent 
of students with disabilities were participating in the general assessment with 
accommodations when necessary. 
2.1.3 Policy Shifts Around the Use of Assessments  
 
As mentioned, NCLB assessments were primarily used for school, district and 
state accountability purposes through most of the early 2000s. Each state also had its own 
achievement standards, on which students were assessed annually. Toward the end of the 
2000s, however, several notable policy changes took place that expanded the uses of 
assessments, while also making the assessments of grade-level standards more difficult 
for everyone. 
In 2009 President Obama announced the Race to the Top (RttT) program, which 
expanded the federal government’s focus from school and district accountability to 
include teacher accountability. USDE stipulated that for states to receive a significant 
monetary award, they must incorporate measures of student learning into teacher 
evaluation systems and adopt rigorous academic content standards. Over three phrases of 
awards, 19 states were given RttT awards, meaning they all committed to implementing 
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these two new requirements (USDE, 2016a). Shortly after the RttT awards were given in 
2010, the USDE also allowed states to apply for waivers from certain ESEA provisions, 
including the requirement for meeting the 100 percent proficiency target by 2014 that 
was set under NCLB. Not surprisingly, to receive a waiver, states were subject to the 
same two requirements from RttT: incorporating student learning measures into educator 
evaluations and adopting more rigorous academic content standards (USDE, 2016b). 
Over the next several years, 42 states received waivers, which means that most of the 
country was now implementing some form of teacher evaluation and the adoption of 
more rigorous content standards.  
Both reforms became relatively controversial within the larger policy context 
because they were expected to be implemented on a relatively short timeline, while so 
little was known about either. The statistical models that were used for evaluating 
educators were in their infancy and not well understood by many, especially by the 
educators who were being evaluated using them. The new academic content standards 
that states adopted were made public around the same time as RttT, meaning that teachers 
needed to learn how to teach their students the content of these new standards, while 
simultaneously being evaluated on the student assessment results on which the standards 
were being assessed (Bakeman, 2015; Fairbanks, 2015).  
According to the Education Next Poll on School Reform conducted by 
Henderson, Peter and West in 2016, many supported the Common Core State Standards 
(CCSS) early in their implementation; however, this confluence of challenges negatively 
affected support over time. In 2013, 76 percent of teachers supported the standards; this 
number dropped to 40 percent in 2015. When omitting references to accountability (i.e. 
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teacher evaluation), teachers were slightly more in favor of the use of the standards in 
their schools. Members of the public, teachers and parents all reported that the use of the 
standards in their district had a negative impact. Of those who knew the standards were in 
use (34 percent of survey respondents), 51 percent reported they had a negative impact. 
Seventy-three percent of teachers reported that the standards were being used, and 49 
percent of them reported a negative effect (Henderson, Peter and West, 2016).  
In relation to support for annual assessments on the standards, the same poll found 
that 67 percent of the public supported annual testing, while 21 percent opposed it. 
Parents were more supportive than teachers of continuing to assess annually, with 66 
percent of parents responding they supported it, while just 47 percent of teachers 
supported it. With respect to the utility of the resulting scores, only 16 percent of parents 
reported that a standardized assessment is an accurate indicator of what his or her child 
learned in the classroom, while 22 percent felt teacher grades were accurate, 25 percent 
reported that written observations were accurate, and 37 percent reported that actual 
student work was an accurate indicator of what their child knew. 
Taken together, this research shows that about half of parents and teachers are 
supportive of annual testing, with a small proportion reporting that standardized 
assessment scores are an accurate indicator of what a child knows. In addition, roughly 
half of parents and teachers supported the CCSS, which were now being assessed on 
annual tests. This lack of support for each of the reform initiatives is, perhaps, what led 
some to gravitate toward the opt out movement.  
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2.2 Who supports the opt-out movement? 
 
As students are the ones ultimately being assessed, it is they who must opt out of 
a state assessment. However, the media reports and research about the reasons for opt out 
have focused primarily on the actions of policymakers that may have led people to 
question state assessments and their associated uses, and on teachers and parents for 
influencing children to opt out. To date, only a handful of media reports exist around the 
reasons for which students chose to opt out, and focus mostly at the high school level. 
While opting out at the high school level has taken place in great numbers, it also 
occurred in substantial numbers in lower grades in several states. Given this 
phenomenon, some researchers have investigated the adults who support the opt out 
movement, under the hypothesis that they may in turn influence the magnitude of opt out 
in their localities. 
Pizmony-Levy & Green Saraisky (2016) conducted a survey of approximately 
1,600 opt out activists in early 2016 as a means to better understand parent motivations 
for supporting the opt out movement and for allowing their children to opt out. The 
authors found that respondents to their survey who were considered opt out activists, 
because they frequented opt out websites, tended to be predominantly white women, and 
relatively more educated and wealthier than the U.S. general public. Average income of 
respondents was $125,000, compared with a median of $53,000 for U.S. households. In 
addition, 97 percent reported having completed postsecondary education, with almost 60 
percent reported as having a graduate degree.  Finally, 45 percent of respondents reported 
they were teachers or educators, and another 16 percent reported having teachers or 
educators in their circle of friends.  
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Most activists reported positively about their own schools, either their child’s or 
the ones where they work. Sixty-eight percent responded they would give their own 
school an A or a B, which is more positive than the U.S. general public, where 51 percent 
gave schools in their community the same grades. The authors hypothesized that this 
could be due to one of two situations (or both): Activist respondents are wealthier, and 
have access to what most would consider better quality schools in their neighborhoods, 
and/or they reject the current popular notion that schools in the U.S. are failing.  
According to Pizmony‐Levy & Green Saraisky (2016), 44 percent of educators, 
which made up half of the respondents in their survey, reported they did not support the 
use of test scores in teacher evaluation. Thirty-two percent reported that standardized 
tests force teachers to teach to the test, 22 percent reported that standardized tests take 
away valuable instructional time, and 18 percent did not support the implementation of 
CCSS. 
Henderson, Peter, and West (2016) reported in their poll that 32 percent of parents 
supported the right to opt out of a state assessment and 52 percent opposed this right. 
Teachers felt similarly to parents, with 32 percent supporting the movement, and 57 
opposing it. Members of the public (respondents without children) were less likely to be 
supportive of allowing students to opt-out, with 25 percent supporting the idea and 59 
percent opposed to it.  
In a poll conducted by Phi Delta Kappa and Gallup in 2015, 41 percent of parents 
supported the right to opt out of a state assessment. When asked about their own children, 
only 31 percent of parents reported they would opt their child out of the state assessment, 
and 59 percent reported that would not opt their child out. Differences in favorability 
22 
 
toward opt-out existed across demographic groups, with Black and Hispanic respondents 
less likely to be in favor of it when compared with White respondents. Bennett (2016) 
and others argue that this may be due to differences in educational quality across 
demographic groups, where a standardized assessment score serves as an objective 
measure that can shine a light on disparities.  
Pizmony‐Levy & Green Saraisky (2016) asked activists whether they opted their 
own children out of a state assessment, and found that 63.3 percent reported opting all of 
their children out, and 11.2 opted some of their children out. Most of the parents also 
reported they would likely opt their children out in the future as well (82.8 percent very 
likely; 9.3 percent likely).  
2.3 Federal Policies on Opting Out 
 
 The future of opting children out depends, in large part, on the implications for 
doing so. The only federal requirement is that 95 percent of eligible students participate 
in the state assessments, with exceptions for students with disabilities who should 
participate in an alternate assessment. For states that do not meet the participation 
requirement, the federal government can impose one or several sanctions, depending on 
the magnitude of the issue. In 2015, USDE officials wrote to 13 state education agencies, 
asking how their states planned to handle low participation, and outlined the potential 
sanctions that exist if the issue persists (Ujifusa, 2015). In their letter, officials offered 
potential ways the state might address low participation, including:  
1. “Lowering a local education agency’s (LEA’s) or school’s rating in the State’s 
accountability system or amending the system to flag an LEA or school with a 
low participation rate; 
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2. Counting non-participants as non-proficient in accountability determinations; 
3. If the State has received ESEA flexibility, identifying a school that misses 
participation rate targets over multiple years as a priority or focus school; 
4. Requiring an LEA or school to develop an improvement plan, or take corrective 
actions to ensure that all students participate in the Statewide assessments in the 
future, and providing the SEA’s plan to review and monitor such plans; 
5. Requiring an LEA or school to implement additional interventions aligned with 
the reason for inadequate student participation, even if the State’s accountability 
system does not officially designate schools for such interventions; 
6. Designating an LEA or school as “high risk,” or a comparable status under the 
State’s laws and regulations, with clear explanations for the implications of such a 
designation; and/or 
7. Withholding or directing use of State aid and/or funding flexibility.” 
State education agencies could choose one of the above options for addressing 
low participation in schools to ensure that the issue does not persist (Chism, 2015). In the 
event that issues do persist, the USDE also outlined in their letter to states the potential 
sanctions against the education agency that exist for low participation: 
• A formal request that a state comply; 
• Increased department monitoring of a state; 
• Conditions on federal title I aid provided for low-income students; 
• Placing a state on “high-risk” status; 
• Issuing a cease-and-desist order; 
• Entering into a compliance agreement with a state; 
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• Withholding all or a portion of a state’s Title I administrative funding; or  
• Suspending, and then withholding, all or a portion of a state’s Title I grant. 
In her letters, USDE Assistant Secretary Deborah Delisle wrote that states missing 
the assessment participation threshold could also face a loss of funding for other 
programs, including monies from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, School 
Improvement Grants, programs for English language learners, rural schools and migrant 
students, as well as Title II, which funds professional development and training for 
teachers (Camera, 2015). Because of the increase in student opt outs and the increased 
federal pressure to address the issue, state policies and laws related to opt out have begun 
to change.  
2.4 State-Level Opt Out Policies and Activities 
Lorenzo (2016) reported that state opt out policies generally fall into four groups:  
1. Opt out is prohibited (34 states and Washington D.C.); 
2. Opt out is permitted completely (California and Colorado); 
3. Refusal is permitted or opt out is permitted with constraints (10 states); and 
4. Opt out policy is left to local districts (Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and South 
Dakota). 
Rowland-Woods, Wixom, & Aragon (2015) reported specific state-level policies 
on student and parent rights for not participating in the state standardized assessment. The 
authors found that opting out is currently technically allowed in statute in Utah and 
California, and may have been in law in New Jersey and North Dakota. However, New 
Jersey’s current policy prohibits schools and districts from opting students out of the state 
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assessment – and the bill that was introduced did not make it passed the state legislature. 
There are other states where the state department of education allows students to opt-out, 
such as in Minnesota or Michigan (though Michigan advises against it).  When Rowland-
Woods et al published their paper, students in Oregon could exercise a religious 
exemption, which is one of several available exemptions to students in different states. 
Other exemptions include physical disability, medical reasons, or emergencies. In Texas 
and Arkansas, participation in the state assessment is mandatory. For the most part, 
guidance to parents typically cites section 111 of NCLB, which states students should 
take part in the state assessment.  
According to Bennett’s 2016 research across states, the greatest proportion of opt-
out took place in New York, where it was about 20 percent in ELA and Math. Table 1 
contains rates for the states listed in the Bennett (2016) report. Rhode Island, Colorado, 
and Maine all had rates higher than the 5 percent rule set by USED as part of NCLB.  
Bennett reports that the rate of refusal in high schools was also much higher than at the 
elementary grades. In Washington state the 11th grade refusal rate was 49 percent in ELA 
and 53 percent in Math, where over all grades, the rate was 2 and 3 percent, respectively. 
He also reports that the high school refusal rate was the primary reason states were put on 
alert by USED for low-participation rates.  
FairTest (2015) provided the number of students that opted out across states as 
well, the estimates of which were based on media and direct reports from people working 
in a particular state. Overall, FairTest estimated that more than 670,000 students opted 
out of state assessments across the country, though that number has not been 
independently verified for all states on their list. They report that 240,000 students opted 
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out in New York, 130,000 in New Jersey, and 100,000 in Colorado. Eight additional 
states had more than 10,000 students opt out in 2014-15. More detailed examples from 
several states follow. 
2.4.1 Washington 
 
Administrators from the Washington State Board of Education published a 
presentation of assessment results for 2014-15, where they cite three primary drivers for 
opt out on state assessments: a new assessment system, new learning standards, and 
organized opposition to testing in general, and the Smarter Balanced Assessment 
Consortium (SBAC) and Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Career 
(PARCC) assessments in particular (Parr & Teed, 2016).  In their presentation, Parr & 
Teed write that approximately 22 districts had participation rates lower than 30 percent 
on the 11th grade Math Smarter Balanced Assessment. They also find that there was a 
negative relationship between the percent of test refusals and the percent of free or 
reduced lunch meals in a district.  
In addition, they found that about 20 percent of the 2,162 schools in Washington 
with data did not meet the federal participation rate requirements. Most of those that 
failed were high schools, where 95 percent failed to meet the requirement. The median 
participation rate for elementary and middle schools was 95 percent, where it was around 
15 percent across subjects at the high school level.  
2.4.2 New Jersey 
 
Harris & Fessenden (2015) report that in New Jersey, about 4.6 percent of 
students in grades 3-8 did not participate, while almost 15 percent did not in Grade 11. 
Perhaps because of the magnitude of opt out, New Jersey legislature introduced a bill that 
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laid out procedures for students to opt out of the state assessment, so as to avoid 
confusion during the PARCC testing window.  
In the bill, schools would have been required to provide students with an alternate 
activity during testing while others are taking the test. The bill also would have required 
that school districts provide information to parents about the subject area, the 
administration dates, the manner in which the results were going to be used, and whether 
the assessment is required by the federal or local government. The legislature ultimately 
passed a nonbinding resolution requiring the state education commissioner to provide 
guidelines to school districts for students who refuse to take the assessment. 
Officials from the New Jersey Department of Education released an “action plan 
development guide” in late 2015, meant to provide districts with specific steps for 
improving participation for schools or subgroups with low participation in the 2014-15 
school year (New Jersey Department of Education, 2015). The guide advises districts to 
perform a root cause analysis of the reasons students may have chosen to opt out, by 
attempting to answer such questions as:  
• “How many students did not take the assessments because they refused or their 
parents would not permit them to take the test? What were their concerns?”  
• “Did we have a large number of voids? If so, what were the reasons (e.g., students 
discontinued taking the test, students did not respond to a sufficient number of 
questions to get a valid score)?” 
The guide also provides strategies that may help to address some of the reasons 
students chose to opt out. For instance, one strategy in the guide was to have 
administrators meet with a PARCC special education advisory group to discuss available 
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accommodations for special needs students. Another strategy was to have staff meet 
directly with parents to support the interpretation of PARCC score reports.  
2.4.3 Connecticut 
 
In a presentation released by the Connecticut Department of Education (CDE), 
officials argue that assessment participation is a matter of educational equity, and that 
“inferences derived from assessment results is partially dependent on the percentage of 
students who participated in the assessment” (Butler & Gopalakrishnan, 2016). In the 
presentation, administrators point to federal and state law that requires at least 95 percent 
participation in the assessment, though their stated goal is 100 percent. They also specify 
four categories for district or school participation rates that could lead to the withholding 
of funds. Similar to New Jersey officials, Connecticut outlines the reasons for which 
students may not participate in the assessment, and offer strategies for addressing those 
reasons. 
2.4.4 New York 
 
Prior to the increase in opt out, and in anticipation of it, NYSED released a policy 
memo to district superintendents and principals of all public schools, summarizing state 
and federal policy on student participation in the state assessment (Katz, 2013). In the 
memo, a state assessment administrator wrote that the state assessment is considered to 
be part of the course of study for students. He also stated there is no provision that allows 
for students to opt out of the state assessment, and doing so may have negative 
consequences for schools and districts. Finally, he mentioned that participation in field 
tests is also important for the reliability and validity of the operational tests.  
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Two years after the release of the memo, NYSED (2015) reported that 
approximately 240,000 fewer students took the assessment in 2014-15. They also 
reported that those who chose to opt out were in primarily white middle- and upper-
income districts, centered in and around Long Island. In New York City, the refusal rate 
was just 2 percent. In addition, students who refused were more likely to be lower 
achieving in the prior year when compared with those who participated in the assessment.  
Chingos (2015) used publicly available data to determine the statewide opt-out 
rate in New York, which he reported to be 28 percent across the 648 districts in his 
dataset, and 21 percent when he weighted the calculation by district enrollment. He 
reported that this downward trend implies that larger districts tended to have lower opt-
out rates. He also reported that 20 percent of districts had opt out rates lower than 10 
percent, while 13 percent had a majority of their students (> 50 percent) opt out. Harris 
(2015) corroborates these findings in reporting that in 60 districts, the number of refusers 
outnumbered the number of test-takers. 
In his analysis, Chingos also found that the percent of students receiving 
free/reduced lunch (FRL), student enrollment, and student prior achievement all 
decreased as opt out rates increased. To take the analysis further, he regressed the percent 
of opt-out in a classroom on percent FRL and average test scores and found that the 
positive correlation between test scores and opt-out became negative when FRL is taken 
into account. His interpretation was that a one standard deviation increase in test scores 
was associated with a 7-percentage point decline in the opt-out rate, when controlling for 
FRL.  
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Rice, Marland, and Meyer (2016) found in their analysis that schools with higher 
opt out rates likely experienced an increase in achievement scores due to nonparticipation 
of lower-achieving students. They estimated the difference between opt out and non-opt 
out students to be approximately .2 standard deviation units on the score scale in Math 
and .12 in ELA. In addition, they found that there was a small but significant difference 
in student growth percentiles from the prior year between those who opted out and those 
who participated in the assessment. Across grades and subjects, the authors report a 2-
point difference in student growth percentiles between the two groups. 
American Institutes for Research (AIR) conducted an in-depth analysis of opt out 
for NYSED as part of their value-added contract with the state to ensure that teacher 
value-added estimates were unaffected (AIR, 2016). They found that opt out was non-
random, with lower proportions of English Learners and economically disadvantaged 
students in classrooms with higher proportions of opt out. They reported there was a 
strong relationship between average participation and prior achievement across grades 
(with the exception of Grade 6). Almost 50 percent of teachers had non-participation 
rates lower than 10 percent (Table 2). Classrooms with higher proportions of non-
participation tended to have higher prior achievement when compared with classrooms 
with zero or low non-participation. Similarly, high non-participation classrooms had 
lower proportions of high-need children.  
This finding by AIR may seem in contradiction to what NYSED reported in their 
earlier analysis. At the student level, NYSED found that students who opted out were 
more likely to be at the bottom two levels on the state assessment, whereas AIR found 
that classrooms with high proportions of opt out tended to have higher average prior 
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achievement. These two facts taken together can be interpreted to mean that students who 
opted out tended to be lower achieving students in high-achieving classrooms or districts. 
In their analysis, Rice, Marland, and Meyer (2016) analyzed opt out trends at the student, 
school and district levels, and arrived at a similar finding: lower-achieving students in 
higher-achieving classrooms or districts chose to opt out of state assessments in New 
York. 
Finally, teachers with high proportions of non-participation were also less likely 
to be rated as effective or highly effective in the previous year. An in-depth explanation 
of New York’s analysis of the impact of opt out on value-added measures will be 
provided in section 2.5.1.  
2.5 Missing Data Framework 
 
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2, there are several considerations in determining 
how best to handle missingness in data sets, considerations such as item and unit 
nonresponse, univariate and multivariate missing, and the mechanisms by which the data 
are missing. Rubin (1987) offers a framework for determining the types and magnitude of 
nonresponse, as well as a variety of methods for addressing nonresponse in surveys, all of 
which apply to assessments.  
2.5.1 Item nonresponse and unit nonresponse  
 
Item nonresponse is when a person responds to most of an assessment, but omits a 
response to one or several items. Students often fail to respond to items on a state 
assessment for a variety of reasons, such as running out of time or lack of knowledge. 
With respect to opt out, there is a possibility that students chose to exercise their right 
after they began taking the assessment and failed to respond to a string of items. In this 
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case, students would still likely receive a score, unless the teacher recorded the student’s 
assessment as an anomaly. Unit nonresponse is when a person does not respond at all to 
an assessment. As mentioned previously, there are a variety of reasons students may not 
have a valid score for an assessment, but this study primarily focuses on those students 
who are completely missing because they chose to opt out of the assessment.  
2.5.2 Univariate vs. multivariate missing 
 
Also discussed in Section 1.1.2, students missing only the most recent assessment score 
would fit the univariate missing data pattern, because they are only missing one data 
element. Students missing several data elements would be considered multivariate 
missing, which could be the result of students missing consecutive assessment scores, or 
those missing the current year assessment score and other predictor variables used in 
calculations. For instance, a student could have all the assessment scores necessary for 
calculating change over time, but may be missing the demographic controls often found 
in value-added calculations. This pattern does present itself in value-added estimates 
currently, and is often modeled through the use of missing flags for each demographic 
indicator (1 = missing and 0 = not missing). Another possibility that will likely become 
more prevalent this year as opt out persists in some states is that students may be missing 
two consecutive assessment scores.  
2.5.3 Missing Data Mechanisms 
 
The other consideration with missing data is the mechanism by which the pattern was 
created, which is often referred to by one of three categories: missing completely at 
random, missing at random, and missing not at random (Schafer & Graham, 2002; Rubin, 
2014). Each pattern represents a potentially different relationship between the distribution 
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of observable characteristics and missing data, and the reasons for which the data are 
missing. Each mechanism can differentially affect statistical indices often used for 
evaluating the quality of a measure – in particular, the reliability and precision of the 
measure, which in this case are value-added estimates of teacher quality (Schafter & 
Graham, 2002).  
This study is primarily interested in univariate unit nonresponse, which based on 
analyses performed by NYSED and other states, we can assume to be missing not at 
random. Rubin (1987) writes that nonresponse can result in less efficient estimates 
because of the reduction in the number of respondents in a data set. Bias in estimates is 
also likely because nonrespondents are different from respondents, and it is difficult to 
know the exact reasons why nonresponse exists.  
The definition of nonresponse expands from when respondents choose not to 
provide information to when editing procedures reduce the number of responses (unlikely 
responses to a particular question). The definition is further expanded to situations in 
which nonresponse is the result of the instrument design – for instance, only those who 
answer yes to a particular question are exposed to parts of the instrument. 
2.5.1 Addressing Nonresponse in Data 
 
There are two common practices for addressing missing data: discarding cases 
where values are missing, or imputing values based on known information for 
respondents. Nonresponse for a small proportion of respondents is fairly common, and 
could potentially be discarded from analysis. For instance, in past years in New York, a 
small proportion of students did not have a current assessment score and were not 
included in value-added estimates for teachers. There is potential that exclusion could 
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reduce efficiency and increase bias, but a small proportion is likely to only have a small 
impact on overall results. 
Rubin advocates for imputation, either single or multiple imputation, which could 
be utilized in nonresponse situations. Both forms of imputation utilize known information 
for respondents, or for the sample, to estimate missing values for respondents. Single 
imputation is the estimation of one response for respondents with missing data. For 
instance, this might be used to estimate a current or prior assessment score for students 
who opted out based on their assessment scores. The key here is that only one assessment 
score is estimated for that student. This is an attractive technique because it allows for 
relatively straightforward complete data set analysis. Utilizing single imputation is 
slightly problematic, however, in that the score is the result of an estimation, and analysis 
does not take the additional variability due to nonresponse into account. To address this, 
Rubin advocates for the use of multiple imputation. 
Multiple imputation is similar in that the technique estimates missing data 
elements for respondents, but is different in that it imputes multiple possible values for 
each missing data element. The technique is meant to address sampling variability that 
would exist in single imputation. For instance, we might estimate five current year 
assessment scores for students who opted out this year. Analysis becomes less 
straightforward, however, because it requires acknowledging the sampling variability that 
exists from the imputation process.  
However, to date, NYSED and other states have chosen to treat students who opt 
out as missing from the data, meaning they calculate value-added for teachers only with 
those students who took the assessment in the current year. According to AIR (2016), 
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Rubin’s methods require that strong assumptions be made about the reasons for 
nonparticipation. AIR also argues that utilizing a multiple imputation framework ignores 
differential instructional effects for teachers, i.e. two teachers with similar groups of 
students might have very different instructional effects on their students, which would not 
be picked up when imputing assessment scores. For these reasons, NYSED completely 
omitted scores for opt out students, and performed a comparison of model fit with and 
without opt out students, as well as a comparison of mean growth percentiles (MGPs) and 
classifications for teachers in the previous year with and without students who opted out 
in the current year.   
AIR (2016) computed the r-square for the 2013-14 model with (complete model) 
and without the non-participation students from 2014-15 (incomplete model), and found 
very similar results between them. The r-square was approximately .7 across grades, with 
differences no larger than .01 between the complete and incomplete models. At the 
student level, the root mean square of the difference between the two model predictions 
was never larger than .5, which the authors argue translates to one half of one scale score 
point. The correlation of growth percentiles at the student level for those with student 
growth percentiles was .999 in the complete and incomplete models.  
Teacher MGPs in 2013-14 calculated with and without non-participating students 
in 2014-15 were correlated at about .98, suggesting a strong linear relationship between 
them. The relationship between the change in a teacher’s MGP and classroom 
characteristics appeared to not be large and/or systematic for most characteristics. 
Teachers with large positive changes in MGP tended to have lower proportions of 
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economically disadvantaged students. Similarly, large positive changes in MGPs were 
also related to lower non-participation rates.  
AIR (2016) also calculated the mean standard error for the complete and 
incomplete models, and found that the incomplete model had slightly less precision. The 
mean SE/SD for the complete model were 4.18 and 10.92, respectively, while for the 
incomplete model they were 4.57 and 11.16. The mean SE/SD for the complete model 
was .38, and .41 for the incomplete model. Overall, the authors report that a teacher could 
expect to have a difference in their MGP of 2 points.  
According to AIR, 82 percent of teachers were expected to get the same 
classification rating used by the state under both models as a result of opt out, 3.7 percent 
were expected to increase one rating category, 4.3 percent were expected to decrease one 
rating category, and about .1 percent were expected to move both up and down by two 
rating categories. Almost 3 percent of teachers would have expected transitions from the 
top two categories in the complete model to the bottom two in the incomplete model 
(without opt out students). 
Classification agreement between the complete and incomplete model 
effectiveness ratings across all teachers was high – at 93 percent. This is higher than the 
expected rate of classification agreement AIR reported in the previous section. Teachers 
in categories of consequence, however, had lower agreement – only 80 percent of 
teachers in the bottom two rating categories in the complete model remained in the same 
category in the incomplete model. Similarly, 90 percent in the top two categories in the 
complete model did not change categories in the incomplete model. 
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2.6 Value-Added Estimates of Teacher Quality 
As outlined in Section 1.1.2, growth has typically been defined as an increase in 
the percentage of students reaching the proficient mark on the state assessment. Because 
this was seen as a crude growth metric, policymakers began searching for a method that 
gave schools and teachers credit for improving student learning while also holding them 
accountable for students reaching proficiency. 
A variety of growth methodologies exist and are employed for school and 
educator accountability purposes, with calculations and interpretation ranging from 
incredibly simple to complex. Relatively simple student growth scores can be calculated 
on assessments employing a vertical scale, where a common scale is utilized across 
grades (Castellano & Ho, 2013). The common scale is linked to a developmental 
continuum for mastery of a single domain, such that scores in one grade can be subtracted 
from a subsequent one to represent growth across years for students. However, most state 
summative assessments do not employ a vertical scale, possibly because of operational 
challenges associated with maintaining the developmental continuum across years, thus 
precluding them from utilizing this gain score model for holding teachers and schools 
accountable.  
Because of the lack of a vertical scale, growth model adoptions by states over the 
past 10 years or so belong to a family of models where changes in performance from one 
year to the next are calculated for each student and compared to demographically or 
academically similar students and are termed “conditional status models.” (Blank, 2010; 
Castellano & Ho, 2013). Value-added models (VAMs), or “residual gain models”, are 
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one of the members of this family, along with student growth percentiles and multivariate 
models. VAMs use linear regression to estimate expected changes in current test scores, 
given past student scores, with the result represented as a residual gain (or loss) on the 
assessment scale. Many VAMs, like New York’s, include classroom or school 
characteristics as well, which changes interpretation of the difference between predicted 
and actual scores to include similar classrooms or schools as well.  
Meyer (1995) argued that school achievement measures were flawed and provide 
an inaccurate picture of changes in performance over time. In his paper, Meyer posited 
that VAMs provide valuable information about the extent to which schools could 
improve student outcomes, after student, classroom, and school characteristics are 
controlled for in a multi-stage regression model. The central argument to the method is 
that once factors outside of the classroom are accounted for in the model, the residual 
difference between actual and observed achievement can be attributed to a stakeholder in 
the educational system.   
2.6.1 Specifying a Value-Added Model 
 
There are two common implementations of value-added regression models for 
teacher evaluation, and choosing one or the other depends on assumptions made by the 
developer. The first model is parameterized as follows: 
 
 𝐴𝑖𝑔 = 𝜆1𝐴𝑖,𝑔−1 + 𝜆2𝐴𝑖,𝑔−2 + 𝜆3𝐴𝑖,𝑔−3 + 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖𝑔 (1) 
   
Where 𝐴𝑖𝑔 is the current year test score for student 𝑖, 𝜆1, 𝜆2, 𝜆3 are slope parameters, 
𝐴𝑖,𝑔−1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑔−2, 𝐴𝑖,𝑔−3 are prior year scale scores, 𝐸𝑖𝑔 are indicator variables for specific 
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teachers, 𝛽 are teacher estimates of effectiveness, and 𝑒𝑖𝑔 is the student-level error term 
(Guarino, Reckase, Stacy and Wooldridge, 2014). This model is often used because it is 
relatively straightforward for calculating teacher effects, and allows for the calculation of 
teacher-level standard errors. In addition, the use of a teacher fixed effect, 𝛽, controls for 
nonrandom assignment of students to teachers. Conceptually, the teacher indicators 
partial out the effect of the teacher from other covariates in the model, which some argue 
are related to assignment of students to teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; 
Dieterle et al, 2012; Kalogrides, Loeb, & Beteille, 2013). Variations of this model are 
used in practice in several places, including New York City and Hillsborough County, 
Florida.  
 Another common VAM implementation is similar to Equation 1, except teacher 
fixed effects, 𝛽, are not included in the model. Instead, teacher random effects are used in 
a multi-level model, where students are considered to be nested within a classroom. 
Teacher value-added estimates are constructed by averaging the student-level residuals 
within a classroom. Because this model does not include teacher fixed effects, it assumes 
random assignment of students to teachers. New York and Florida both use a form of this 
model, designed by AIR, for evaluating teachers, principals, and schools. Papay (2011) 
and Newton et. al (2010) found that school-level value-added estimates derived using 
these two implementations had Spearman rank correlations between .88 and .92, which 
can be interpreted to mean they achieve similar results, but at least some teachers will be 
ranked differently depending on the choice of model.   
 In both value-added model specifications, states and districts can (and do) include 
covariates considered important for empirical and policy reasons (McCaffrey et al, 2004). 
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The use of student, teacher, or school-level covariates changes the inferences one can 
make from the results of the models because similar groups are compared with each 
other, thus requiring interpretation to be contextualized as relative to similar peers. As 
mentioned, this is an attractive requirement to policymakers who are responsible for 
evaluating teachers, because teachers of high-achieving students are compared to each 
other, as are teachers of lower-achieving students. In general, researchers have found that 
the inclusion of covariates beyond prior achievement has had little effect on teacher 
effectiveness estimates (Ballou et al, 2004; Papay, 2011).  In New York’s random effects 
model, student-level indicators were included for whether the student lived in poverty, or 
received special education or English language supports (AIR, 2015). In addition, 
classroom averages of each demographic characteristic were also included.  
2.6.2 Stability of Value-Added 
 
In a white paper, Kane and Staiger (2010) investigated the stability of teacher 
value-added estimates in New York City and Los Angeles schools.  The authors found 
that correlations of value-added estimates tended to be low to modest across years, 
ranging from .35 to .5 in different studies they performed. Newton et al. (2010) found 
similar correlations in ELA across grades, and slightly higher correlations in Math at .43 
to .63 across grades.  
To investigate the practical implications of differences in value-added estimates 
across years, Kane & Staiger created quartile categories as a classification scheme, and 
found that teachers at the bottom and top quartiles generally tended to stay there. In New 
York City, 68 percent of top quartile Math teachers remained in the top quartile in 
consecutive years, and none moved to the bottom quartile. Similarly, no bottom quartile 
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teachers moved to the top quartile in the next year. When averaging value-added 
estimates for teachers across two years, 80 percent who were in the top quartile in Math 
remained there, and none moved to the bottom quartile.  The classifications were less 
stable in the middle two quartiles, where 44 percent of teachers in the third quartile 
stayed there in a subsequent year, and roughly one quarter moved up or down a quartile. 
Estimates become more stable with more data in the middle quartiles. Kane and Staiger 
found that 56 percent of teachers who start in the third quartile remain there in the next 
year, and 20 percent move up or down a quartile. 
In Los Angeles, teachers in the top quartile in Math in their first year moved 
students up .14 standard deviations in their 3rd and 4th year. This can be interpreted to 
mean that the highest value-added teachers in year one were averaging positive value-
added estimates in the third and fourth years of the study. Bottom quartile teachers saw 
similarly-sized drops in achievement in their students in their 3rd and 4th year. Similar to 
New York City, the predictive power of value-added estimates improved with more data. 
Teachers in the top quartile in their first two years moved students up .17 standard 
deviations above similar students.  Teachers in the bottom quartile after two years lost 
ground with their students, who averaged a loss of .18 standard deviations below similar 
students. 
 McCaffrey et al. (2009) found that approximately 25-35 percent of teachers in the 
bottom quintile of value-added estimates remained there in a subsequent year, while 10 – 
20 percent moved all the way up to the top quintile, depending on the grade. Similarly, of 
those who started in the top quintile, between 25 and 35 percent stayed there while 
approximately 10 – 15 percent moved to the bottom quintile. Intertemporal correlations 
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of teacher value-added estimates across years at the elementary and middle levels were 
about .2 to .3 in the cities in Florida that were studied.  
 In their 2010 study, Newton, et al. classified teachers by deciles, and investigated 
the extent to which there were changes across model specifications, courses, and years. 
Models were specified with and without fixed effects, with and without demographic 
characteristics as covariates, and as a three-level model with demographics. Across 
model specifications, 56 – 80 percent of teachers changed at least 1 decile, between 12 
and 33 percent change by 2 or more deciles, and 0 – 14 percent changed by 3 or more 
deciles. Across years, 74 to 93 percent of teachers changed by 1 or more deciles, 45 to 63 
changed by 2 or more, and 19 – 41 changed by 3 or more deciles.   
2.6.3 Missing Data in Value-Added Estimates 
 
One study, by Papay in 2011, investigated whether missing students could impact 
a teacher’s value-added estimate. The author calculated value-added for teachers using 
two different assessments that were administered in the spring in the same years, meaning 
this is a Spring to Spring calculation for the state assessment and the Scholastic Reading 
Inventory (SRI). He correlated the value-added results derived from both assessments for 
teachers and found there to be a .44 correlation, which is a low to modest correlation. 
Arguing that students could be missing for any number of reasons (such as mobility or 
absence), Papay then restricted his sample to only those students who had data for all 
administrations, and found the correlations improved to .54 for the Spring to Spring 
models using the state assessment and SRI assessment.  
McCaffrey, et al. (2011) utilized data from an urban school district, and found that 
only 20 percent of the 10,332 students who attended school there in a five-year period 
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had complete data for all years. They then studied two possible ways that missing data 
could impact value-added estimates: missing teacher links to students, and missing 
student scores over time, the latter of which is more relevant to the current study. Missing 
teacher links can be problematic in longitudinal situations where one is attempting to 
model the persistence of teacher effects on students over time, in which case a valid 
teacher-student link for each year is required.  
To investigate the impact of missing teacher links, the authors employ three 
methods for generating value-added estimates (termed teacher effects in McCaffrey, et 
al.). The first is to set missing teacher effects to zero, which means that missing teachers 
had no effect on student learning in future years. The second method samples missing 
teacher effects from the same distribution as observed teachers. The third draws missing 
teacher effects from their own distributions, with variance components for the 
distributions estimated separately from the observed teachers. The authors calculated 
three sets of current teacher effects, and found .99 correlations for each grade and subject. 
In addition, the authors found a similar mean and variance for the three sets of teacher 
effects. This aspect of missing data only applies in situations where historic teacher 
effects are modeled as a function of current achievement for students, essentially serving 
as one covariate in the value-added model. In practice, this model is not typically used 
because of the data requirements McCaffrey, et al. mention above. 
The authors also simulated missing scores to investigate the missing at random 
assumption often employed in calculating value-added estimates. To do so, McCaffrey, et 
al. simulated teacher effects for 250 teachers, with 50 per grade, which were centered to 
have a mean equal to zero and variance to 13 percent of the residual variance for each 
44 
 
year. They used teacher effects to generate 100 samples of five years of test score data for 
1,250 students in classes of 25 students to which they were randomly assigned. They then 
use a probability model to predict the number of scores students that would be missing 
from a value-added model. In their simulation, students with lower prior achievement 
scores were expected to have more missing scores, which is typical in achievement data. 
The authors calculated complete value-added and with missing data, and found that the 
estimated teacher effects were relatively robust to missing data. Correlations between the 
true value-added and the average teacher effect across all 100 data sets was higher than 
.99.  Teachers with very small and very large true effects tended to have the largest 
deviation from the average value-added estimates. McCaffrey, et al. write that this is 
likely due to the Bayesian shrinkage used in estimation, which essentially weights teacher 
effects by their reliability.  
Karl, et al (2013) utilized a correlated random effects model to determine the 
extent to which missingness impacted teacher effects in a K-12 setting as well as in a 
university. At the K-12 level, the authors modeled approximately 6 percent missing data 
for 304 fourth, fifth and sixth grade teachers, and calculated teacher random effects. The 
authors found that the relationship between random effects from the MAR condition were 
correlated above .99 to the MNAR conditions. In addition, they found that random effects 
did not predict whether students attended on the day of the test. However, the authors 
argue that while value-added estimates were robust to missingness in their study (and in 
McCaffrey, et al. (2011), missingness should not be ignored and practical implications 
explored. While correlations were high, large differences could exist for even a small 
number of teachers as a result of missing data.  
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As can be seen, very few studies have explored the extent to which missing data 
impacts teacher value-added estimates. Interestingly, the general working assumption by 
policymakers is that there is very little missing data; however, both Papay and McCaffrey 
found that only 20 to 50 percent of students have complete data for all years prior to the 
current year. None of the existing literature addressed a phenomenon like opt out, where 
a large magnitude of students were missing in current data, and could be missing in future 
year calculations without a tenable solution for modeling missing priors. My study aims 
to add to the literature around the impact of missing current achievement scores in value-
added estimates.  
All of the studies published to date have not explored a phenomenon such as opt 
out, where the magnitude was large and the reason for opting out unknown. The current 
study aims to contribute to the literature in that respect.  
 
 
46 
 
CHAPTER 3  
METHODS 
 
3.1 Methods Overview 
 
A simulation study was conducted to examine the amount of bias introduced into 
value-added estimates under various opt out conditions, and to determine the extent to 
which opt out impacted classification of teacher effectiveness measures. Observed scale 
scores were simulated to represent students’ test scores on a typical statewide assessment 
for four grades, hereafter referred to as grades 3, 4, 5, and 6. The probability of opting out 
was simulated using parameter estimates from empirical data. Students were then 
identified for de-selection from the analysis randomly, based on the probability of opting 
out of the assessment, and based on their prior achievement. Grade 6 observed value-
added estimates were calculated in separate models using grades 3, 4, and 5 as 
conditioning years.  
The data were generated using a multivariate sampling approach from Castellano 
and Ho (2014) to produce a nested structure observed in real data; that is, students nested 
within classrooms. Furthermore, to simulate realistic data, the parameters in this 
simulation were based on real test data from empirical analysis from New York. 
Correlations, standard errors, and root mean square differences were investigated across 
conditions to better understand the extent to which error is a function of opt out. Quartiles 
of value-added estimates were used to determine rates of agreement between complete 
and incomplete value-added estimates across replications for every classroom.  
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3.2 Data Generation 
 
3.2.1 Generating observed scale scores 
  
Scale scores were generated using a multivariate normal sampling approach 
utilized in Castellano & Ho (2014) and with parameter estimates from empirical data, 
where within- and between-classroom deviations were sampled from multivariate 
distributions and summed to create student-level observed scores. This sampling allowed 
observed scale scores to be generated for each student in a classroom with the addition of 
a common classroom effect. The multivariate sampling procedure begins with Equation 
(2): 
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where 𝝁 is a vector of average scale scores across all students in the generated data for 
each year, as well as the percent of students who will opt out of the assessment. The 
dimensions of the average scale score and percent of opt out matrix 𝝁 are 5 x 1. 𝚺𝑩 is the 
variance-covariance matrix for the average classroom scale scores and opt out with 
dimensions of 5 x 5. 𝑌𝑔
𝐵is the current year classroom deviation from the average score, 
𝑿𝒈
𝑩 is a classroom deviation for each of the three prior years, and 𝑂𝑔
𝐵 is the classroom 
deviation for opting out. For scale scores, 𝝁 was set to 310 for each year because average 
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scale scores in a state tend to remain relatively stable across years, assuming tests are not 
vertically scaled and have within-grade scales. For the probability of opting out, this was 
varied across three conditions: 5, 10, and 20 percent. The covariances between opting out 
and scale scores was set to zero for all years, except for the immediate prior year.  
 In Equation (3), we have the multivariate sampling procedure for within-class deviations.  
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Where 0 is a 5 x 1 column vector that represents the average of the within-classroom 
deviation for each of the four generated years of scale scores and probability of opting 
out, and 𝚺𝑾 is the 5 x 5 variance-covariance matrix for generating student-level 
deviations from the classroom mean for each year. 𝑌𝑖𝑔
𝑊 is the within-classroom deviation 
for the current year, and 𝑿𝒊𝒈
𝑾  represents the deviation for each of the prior years, and 𝑂𝑖𝑔
𝑊 
is the within-classroom deviation for opting out. To generate current and prior year scale 
scores and the probability of opting out, I used Equations (4), (5) and (6): 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑔 = 𝑌𝑔
𝐵 + 𝑌𝑖𝑔
𝑊 (4) 
 𝑿𝒊𝒈 = 𝑿𝒈
𝑩 + 𝑿𝒊𝒈
𝑾  (5) 
 𝑂𝑖𝑔 = 𝑂𝑔
𝐵 + 𝑂𝑖𝑔
𝑊 (6) 
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑔 is the current year test score for each student in a classroom that is the sum of 
the between and within-group deviations, 𝑌𝑔
𝐵 and 𝑌𝑖𝑔
𝑊, and 𝑿𝒊𝒈 is a matrix containing 
each of the three prior scale scores, the dimensions of which are 𝑁 ×  𝐽 , where 𝑁 equals 
the number of students and 𝐽 equals the number of prior scores. 𝑂𝑖𝑔 is the probability that 
a student will opt out of the state assessment in the current year. 
Data generation required the use of student- and teacher-level correlations of scale 
scores across years, the student-level standard deviation of scale scores, and the intraclass 
correlation observed in real data, which is the proportion of the variance attributed to 
classroom-level differences in scale scores. Intertemporal correlations of scale scores at 
the student level were set to 0.85 between adjacent years, 0.83 for scores with a two-year 
lag (i.e., current with two years prior, one year prior with three years prior), and 0.75 for 
scores with a three-year lag (i.e., current with three years prior.)  
For generating the probability that a student opts out, I used the student-level 
correlation between the dichotomous indicator for opting out from the empirical data and 
the immediate prior year scale score, the correlation between average prior achievement 
and percent of students opting out in a classroom, the student-level standard deviation of 
the dichotomous indicator for opting out, and the intraclass correlation of opting out. The 
dimensions of the correlation matrix that includes scale scores and probability of opting 
out, denoted as 𝐑, are 5 x 5. Correlations between all years of scale scores and opting out 
were set to zero, with the exception for the correlation between opting out and the 
immediate prior year.   
Correlations across years at the teacher-level were set to 0.90 for adjacent years, 
0.85 for scores with a two-year lag, and 0.80 with a three-year lag.  The correlation 
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between average prior achievement and the percent of students opting out in a classroom 
was set to -0.05. These correlations are expressed in a 5 x 5 matrix denoted as 𝐑𝐁. 
Student-level standard deviations were set to 35 for scale scores, which were held 
constant across years. The student-level standard deviation of opting out was set to .4. 
Scale score and opting out standard deviations are expressed in a diagonalized matrix, 𝐃. 
The intraclass correlation, expressed in 𝝎, was set to 0.22 and also held constant across 
years for scale scores, and set to 0.13 for opting out. The 𝝎 matrix is a diagonalized 5 x 5 
matrix.   
First, the total variance-covariance matrix, Σ, which includes within- and 
between-classroom differences, was calculated using the student-level standard 
deviations in 𝐃, and intertemporal correlations in 𝐑 in Equation (7) as follows:  
 𝚺 = 𝐃𝐑𝐃 (7) 
 
Next, the between-classrooms variance-covariance matrix, 𝚺𝐁, were calculated, 
using the intraclass correlation contained in 𝝎, the student-level standard deviation in 𝐃, 
and the classroom-level intertemporal correlations in 𝐑𝐁 in Equation (8):   
 𝚺𝐁 = (√𝛚𝐃)𝐑𝐁(√𝛚𝐃) (8) 
 
The difference between these two matrices results in the within-classroom 
variance-covariance matrix 𝚺𝐖 that was used to generate the student-level within-class 
deviations from the classroom average in Equation (9):  
 𝚺𝐖 = 𝚺 − 𝚺𝐁 (9) 
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3.2.2 Estimating Value-Added Measures of Teacher Quality 
 
To estimate value-added measures of teacher quality, I used a common method 
also utilized in Guarino, Reckase, Stacy and Wooldridge (2014) that estimates a teacher 
effect through the use of dichotomous indicators for each of the 1,000 teachers. The 
model is parameterized as follows: 
 
 𝐴𝑖𝑔 = 𝜆1𝐴𝑖,𝑔−1 + 𝜆2𝐴𝑖,𝑔−2 + 𝜆3𝐴𝑖,𝑔−3 + 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖𝑔 (10) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑖𝑔 is the current year test score for student 𝑖, 𝜆1, 𝜆2, 𝜆3 are slope parameters, 
𝐴𝑖,𝑔−1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑔−2, 𝐴𝑖,𝑔−3 are prior year scale scores, 𝐸𝑖𝑔 are indicator variables for specific 
teachers, 𝛽 are teacher estimates of effectiveness (fixed effects), and 𝑒𝑖𝑔 is the student-
level error term. This model was used because it is relatively straightforward in 
calculating teacher fixed effects, and allows for the calculation of teacher-level standard 
errors. Variations of this model are also used in practice in several places, such as Los 
Angeles Unified School District and Hillsborough County Schools in Florida. 
3.2.3 Empirical Data  
 
Four years of empirical assessment and demographic data for 32,722 students in 
grades 3 - 8 in 122 schools in 28 districts in New York were made available to generate 
parameter estimates for this simulation study. The included school years spanned 2011-
12 to 2014-15. Because these data represent a subset of the state, I compared several 
generating parameter estimates with publicly-available data from the state’s website. As 
mentioned in Section 3.1, I intend to generate 6th grade scale scores in Math, so I 
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restricted my sub-sample data to only those students, which resulted in 8,023 students 
(Table 3). This is approximately 4 percent of the state’s total 6th grade population.  
In my sample, average Math achievement for those with scores in 2015 was 308, 
compared to 304 statewide. While not explicitly modeled in my analysis, I also compared 
demographic characteristics for students in my sub-sample with the rest of the state. In 
the sub-sample, 51.9 percent of students are identified as living in poverty, while only 
37.6 percent of students are statewide. The percent of English language learners is similar 
at 7.9 for the sample and 7 statewide. Lastly, the percent of students with disabilities is 
15.7 statewide and 13 in the sample data.  
In sum, my sample data appears to contain slightly higher-achieving students than 
the rest of the state, at least for those who participated in the assessment in 2015. Students 
in my sample also appear to opt out to a slightly lesser extent, which could possibly be 
due to differences in the way I identified opt outs, which is explained in the next section. 
Finally, a greater proportion of students in my sample live in poverty than in the rest of 
the state, and they appear to be slightly less likely to be identified as having a disability 
than the rest of the state.  
3.2.4 Identifying Students as Opt out in Empirical Data 
 
As part of the requirements under the evaluation process in New York State, each 
district must report to the state teacher-student linkage information that identifies a 
teacher-of-record for every student. Also included are the number of minutes a student is 
in a teacher’s classroom during the course of the year. The state uses this information 
when calculating growth measures for use in evaluation, and returns to each district a 
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data file with a reason for why the student was or was not included in growth 
calculations.  
Using the empirical data provided by the state, students were considered opt outs 
if they were linked to teachers for the entire year but had no valid current year test score. 
This means that the student was in a tested grade and linked to a teacher, but had no valid 
test score for the same year. Students who did not meet minimum enrollment and 
attendance duration requirements were dropped from analysis, unless they were also 
identified as not having a valid current year test score, in which case they were also 
considered opt outs. All students with valid test scores were considered test-takers for the 
purposes of the analyses.  
 
3.3 Simulation Conditions 
 
As mentioned, the mean probability of opt out was set to 5, 10 and 20 percent, 
which is meant to simulate varying degrees of opt out in the data. I simulated 100 data 
sets for each condition for a total of 300 data sets. In each data set, students were chosen 
for opt out (or de-selected from analysis) randomly (Condition 1 below), based on their 
probability of opting out generated in the previous steps (Conditions 2), or based on their 
place in the prior achievement distribution (Conditions 3 & 4). There are four conditions 
for each magnitude of opt out that simulate possible real-life scenarios across states:  
1. Students are excluded randomly across the achievement distribution so that 5, 10 
or 20 percent of students are excluded; 
2. Students with the highest probability of opt out across the prior achievement 
distribution were chosen so that 5, 10 or 20 percent of students are excluded; 
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3. Fifty percent of students chosen for opt out are the lowest achieving students in 
the top quartile of prior achievement classrooms; the remaining 50 percent are 
from the other three quartiles of prior achievement; and 
4. Fifty percent of students chosen for opt out are the highest achieving students in 
the top quartile of prior achievement classrooms; the remaining 50 percent are 
from the other three quartiles of prior achievement 
 
Value-added estimates were calculated once with all students in the analysis for 
the 100 complete data sets, and once for each of the four conditions with students 
deselected from analysis. This results in 500 value-added estimates of effectiveness for 
teachers: one complete value-added estimate, and four based on opt out simulation 
conditions.  
Lastly, the number of students associated with teachers was varied to have a mean 
of 30 and standard deviation of 10, which mirrors a typical elementary school classroom. 
The minimum classroom size was 1 student and the maximum was 63. However, as noted 
later, classrooms with fewer than 11 students were excluded from stability analysis. The 
total sample size of students per replication was approximately 30,000, and the total 
sample size of teachers per replication will be 1,000.  
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
The relationship between the classroom-level complete and incomplete value-
added estimate was examined using the Pearson correlation coefficient. Correlations 
between complete and incomplete value-added estimates and prior achievement were 
examined as a check on whether teachers with higher-achieving incoming students could 
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expect to receive higher VA estimates.  I also provide descriptives for the distributions of 
value-added estimates obtained under each condition; in particular, means, variances and 
kurtosis. While I anticipate means to remain relatively stable, it is possible that variances 
may change as a result of missing data, as well as the peak of the distribution. 
The stability of the complete and incomplete value-added models was examined 
by calculating the root mean square difference between the incomplete and complete 
value-added models across replications from AIR (2016):  
 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐷 = √𝑛−1∑(𝑉𝐴_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑘 − 𝑉𝐴_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑘)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (11) 
The difference between the incomplete and complete VA estimate was calculated 
for each classroom, j, as well as k replications (k = 1, 2, …, K), where K=100. The result 
will be on the value-added scale, which is represented in standard deviation units. I also 
calculated the root mean square difference between value-added estimates obtained under 
the missing at random condition (#1) and estimates from the MNAR conditions (#2, #3, 
and #4).  
I also examined the extent to which standard errors of teacher fixed effects 
increase as a result of students opting out of the assessment, by finding the average 
standard error and the root mean square difference for both the complete and incomplete 
models.  
Lastly, to investigate the practical implications of opt out on value-added 
estimates, I classified teachers into four rating categories using quartiles, with teachers 
classified based on their complete and incomplete value-added estimate for each of the 
data sets. Quartiles were used because they often are in research settings, so as not to 
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adopt issues inherent in various classification schemes. The number and proportion of 
classifications in agreement between complete and incomplete value-added estimates 
across all replications and conditions was calculated, as well as weighted Kappa. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS 
 
First, I provide descriptive detail on the simulated scale score data that was used 
to generate value-added estimates, as a means for ensuring the data approximate desired 
and realistic conditions. Included in this section is the distribution of the percent of opt 
out in each teacher’s classroom across conditions and magnitude. I also provide detail on 
the average prior achievement for students in each of the four opt out and three 
magnitude conditions, and I provide correlations for the relationship between prior 
achievement and opt out conditions at the student and teacher level.  
Next, I provide detail on the distribution of value-added estimates across each of 
the conditions, including means, standard deviations, and a measure of kurtosis, which is 
also provided as a means for ensuring that the value-added models approximate results 
from practical settings. Finally, correlations, root mean square difference of value-added 
estimates and standard errors, and classification agreement are presented as a means for 
exploring stability under the various opt out and magnitude conditions. 
I use the following terminology throughout to refer to the types and percent of opt 
out: “Opt out conditions” refer to the four types of opt out that are simulated. These are: 
• the “random” condition refers to students who were dropped randomly from 
analysis; 
• “highest probability” refers to the condition where students were dropped based 
on the probability of opting out, which was predicted using prior achievement; 
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• “lowest achieving” refers to the condition where 50 percent of opt out students 
had the lowest prior achievement in the top quartile of prior achievement of all 
classrooms, and the other 50 percent of opt out students were randomly selected. 
• “highest achieving” refers to the condition where 50 percent of opt out students 
had the highest prior achievement in the top quartile of prior achievement of all 
classrooms, and the other 50 percent of opt out students were randomly selected 
to opt out; and 
Finally, the term “magnitude”, when applied to a condition, refers to the 5, 10 and 20 
percent opt out conditions that were simulated for each of the four opt out conditions.  
4.1 Distribution of Percent Opt Out Across Conditions and Magnitudes 
 In an effort to make clear the extent to which each opt out and magnitude 
condition impacts opt out rates, I first provide more information about the distribution of 
the percent opt out for teachers across conditions and magnitude. I also utilize opt out 
categories found in the AIR Technical report (2016) so the reader has a comparison point. 
The percent of opt out across magnitude and opt out conditions appears to be what 
I would expect, with the greatest proportion of teachers generally falling into the 
magnitude category that was being simulated (Tables 4 –7). For instance, in the random 5 
percent category, we see that 64.2 percent of teachers have between 0 and 10 percent 
(Table 4). In the 20 percent random condition, 67.5 percent of teachers have between 10 
and 25 percent opt out in their classrooms (Table 4). In both the random and highest 
probability conditions, the proportion of teachers with more than 50 percent of students 
opting out is relatively low, with the exception of the 20 percent condition when students 
are selected based on the probability of opting out (Tables 4 & 5).  
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In the highest and lowest achieving conditions, the proportion of teachers with 
more than 50 percent of opt out students is substantially more in the 20 percent condition 
than in the other opt out and magnitude conditions (Tables 6 & 7). In the highest 
achieving student condition, 13.8 percent of teachers have more than 50 percent of 
students opting out, and 14.3 percent have more than 50 percent in the lowest-achieving 
student condition. This difference is because I purposely selected half of the opt out 
students (10 percent of the total students) to be from the top quartile of classrooms, while 
the other half were from the other three quartiles, which concentrates a substantial 
amount of students in approximately 250 of the 1,000 simulated classrooms, and creates 
more opportunity for teachers to have high proportions of opting out. Figures 4 –7 
display the distributions of the percent of opt out for each condition and magnitude.  
In Table 8, I list the number and percent of teachers with exactly zero students in 
each opt out condition. In this table, we can see that, of the 100,000 teachers (1,000 
teachers in 100 replications), there are very few teachers who drop out of analysis fully 
because all of their students were chosen as opt outs. The highest achieving condition has 
the greatest number of teachers, with 43 in the 10 percent condition and 37 in the 20 
percent condition.  
In addition, I also included in Table 9 the number and percent of teachers with 10 
or fewer students after de-selection. As mentioned previously, these teachers were 
excluded from all of the proceeding stability analyses because states typically include all 
students and teachers with data in estimation, but do not provide effectiveness ratings for 
teachers that do not meet a threshold for a minimum number of students. In my analysis, I 
required that teachers have more than 10 students because that is the minimum number 
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used in some states. Table 9 shows that the highest and lowest achieving conditions had 
the highest number and proportion of teachers with 10 or fewer students. Nearly 11 
percent of teachers in the 20 percent condition were excluded in the highest achieving 
condition, and just over 9 percent were excluded in the lowest achieving.  
4.2 Average Prior Achievement Across Conditions 
As a check on the data generation process, I provide more information on the 
average prior achievement of students across opt out and magnitude conditions. In the 
random condition, average prior achievement is the same for students who opted out and 
for those who did not (Table 10). We can see that the average is 310 across all three 
magnitude conditions as well. 
In the highest probability condition, average prior achievement is slightly lower 
for students who opted out across all three magnitude conditions. The average is 303 for 
opt out students and 310 for those who did not opt out in the 5 percent magnitude 
condition. I expect opt out students, in this case, to be lower achieving because I 
negatively correlated the probability of opting out with achievement in the immediate 
prior year. However, the average increases slightly for the 10 and 20 percent conditions 
because I am selecting more students with lower probabilities of opting out in order to 
achieve the desired magnitude.   
In addition, the probability of opting out is much higher for students who did opt 
out, when compared with those who were not selected to do so in the data generation 
process. In the 5 percent condition, the average probability of opting out is .85 for opt out 
students, compared with .15 for non-opt out students. The probability of opting out is 
slightly lower as the magnitude of opt out increases from 10 to 20 percent. In the 10 
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percent condition, the average probability is .79, and .74 for 20 percent conditions. 
Again, to achieve the desired magnitude, it was necessary to select students with lower 
probabilities for opting out.  
In Table 10, we can also see that the average prior achievement for the highest 
achieving students who opt out is 355 in the 5 percent magnitude condition, compared to 
307 for students who did not opt out. We see substantially higher achievement for opt out 
students in the 10 and 20 percent conditions when compared to the students who were not 
selected for opting out. Figure 10 provides a visual for the achievement of these students, 
where the distribution of achievement is almost bifurcated. This bifurcation is the result 
of selecting approximately half of the opt out students to be the highest achieving in the 
top quartile of classrooms, while the other half were randomly selected from the other 
three quartiles of achievement. Because of this targeted selection, we see what 
approximates a normal distribution for lower-achieving students, and a sharp increase in 
achievement for opt out students at the higher end of the achievement distribution.  
For the teacher level in the highest achieving condition, Figure 14 displays the 
percent of opt out as a function of average prior achievement for each magnitude. In the 
figure, we can see that, for the most part, percent opt out is relatively similar across the 
range of classroom average prior achievement, except that we see a steep increase in opt 
out beginning around the 315 scale score in each magnitude. This stands to reason, as we 
purposely selected higher achieving students to opt out, so we would expect higher 
percentages of opt out at the high end of the achievement scale. 
Finally, average prior achievement for opt out students in the lowest-achieving 
condition is 290 in the 5 percent magnitude condition, compared with 311 for students 
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who do not opt out. Similar to the highest-achieving student condition, prior achievement 
increases as the magnitude of opt out increases, with an average of 296 in the 10 percent 
condition and 306 in the 20 percent condition. In Figure 11, we can see that the prior 
achievement distribution is also bifurcated, except the increase in percent of opt out is at 
the lower end of the achievement scale. In addition, Figure 15 displays the teacher-level 
percent of opt out as a function of average prior achievement for the lowest achieving 
condition. Here, we see a steep increase in percent opt out at around 325 on the 
achievement scale, which then tapers off as prior achievement increases.      
4.3 Correlations Between Prior Achievement and Opt Out 
In Table 11, we see the student- and teacher-level correlations between prior 
achievement and opting out. At the student level, the correlation is between the 
dichotomous opt out and each student’s prior achievement. At the teacher level, the 
correlation is between average prior achievement and the percent of students who opted 
out.  
In the random condition, the student- and teacher-level correlations are 0 for the 
5, 10 and 20 percent magnitude conditions. In the highest probability condition, student- 
and teacher-level correlations are slightly negative, which was by design and based on 
empirical data. In the highest achieving condition, the student-level correlations between 
prior achievement and opt out range from .31 in the 5 percent condition to .39 in the 20 
percent condition. At the teacher level, the correlations range from .64 in the 5 percent 
condition to .74 in the 20 percent condition.  
Finally, the student-level correlations between prior achievement and opt out in 
the lowest achieving condition range from -0.14 to -0.06 across the three magnitude 
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conditions, and range from .45 to .6 at the teacher level. The last two conditions (highest 
and lowest achieving students) were meant to serve as extreme examples where opt out is 
a function of prior achievement at the student and teacher levels. In addition, the lowest 
achieving condition was meant to represent an example of Simpson’s paradox, where we 
have a negative correlation at the student level and a positive one at the teacher level, 
which represents a higher level of aggregation.  
4.4 Value-Added Distributions 
As mentioned, value-added estimates where teachers had 10 or fewer students are 
not included in the following analysis. In Table 12, we see that the mean value-added 
estimate is 0 across all conditions (opt out and magnitude), which is by design. Scale 
scores were entered into the value-added equation as z-scores, which mean centers them 
with a standard deviation of 1. The resulting coefficient estimates should also have a 
mean of zero as well.  
The standard deviations shown in Table 12 are similar across opt out and 
magnitude conditions, and are similar to, but slightly lower than, what we would see in 
empirical data. In the simulated data, we see standard deviations around .22 for each of 
the conditions, except in the highest achieving condition where the standard deviations 
range from .23 in the 5 percent condition to .25 in the 20 percent condition. In empirical 
data, typical standard deviations range from .25 to .3.  
In Table 12, kurtosis remains fairly consistent across all simulation conditions, 
with values around 3 in each. We can interpret this to mean that the distribution of value-
added estimates is similar to that of a normal distribution, at least with respect to the 
density around the mean estimate. 
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4.5 Stability of Value-Added Estimates 
4.5.1 Correlations 
 
As a first step toward investigating stability of value-added estimates I calculated 
the Pearson correlations of complete estimates with the incomplete estimates from each 
of the four opt out conditions and three magnitude conditions for a total of 12 correlation 
coefficients. In Table 13, we see that the correlations are all higher than .99 for the 5 and 
10 percent magnitude condition. The correlations range from .981 - .983 for the 20 
percent condition, which is only slightly lower than the other two magnitudes.   
4.5.2 Root Mean Square Difference of Value-Added Estimates 
 
As outlined in the methods section, I calculated the root mean square difference 
(RMSD) between the complete value-added estimates with all students included, and for 
the incomplete value-added estimates for each opt out condition (4 conditions) in each of 
the three magnitude conditions. The RMSD’s for the random condition serve as a 
baseline, by which we can compare estimates from the other three conditions to 
determine the extent to which the simulated nonrandomness impacts the estimates.  
As we see in Table 14, RMSD’s increases in each condition as the magnitude of 
opt out increases, with an average of .02 for the 5 percent magnitude condition across 
replications, .03 for the 10 percent condition, and .04 for the 20 percent condition. An 
RMSD of .04 in the 20 percent condition represents an average difference in value-added 
estimates of almost .2 of a standard deviation (Table 14), which is sizeable. This can be 
interpreted to mean that a teacher in New York, for instance, could expect to move up or 
down .2 of a standard deviation in value-added estimates if 20 percent of students opt out.  
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Across opt out conditions, we see that RMSD’s are fairly consistent, with the 
exception of the highest achieving condition, where we see a slight increase in RMSD 
over the random condition. This increase of approximately .006 - .008 in RMSD across 
each magnitude of opt out is fairly minimal, but does represent a difference that is due to 
this type of nonrandomness, where 50 percent of the students opting out are the highest 
achieving in the highest achieving classrooms.  
In an effort to demonstrate how the differences in value-added estimates are a 
function of prior achievement, I present in Figures 16 – 19 the average absolute 
difference in value-added between complete and incomplete data sets by prior 
achievement for each of the four opt out conditions. In the figures, the actual difference 
in value-added is presented, and not the RMSD’s, because RMSD’s are calculated for 
each replication, and prior achievement is fairly consistent across replications by design. I 
also present differences in value-added as a function of the percent of opt out in Figures 
20 –23.  
In Figure 16, we can see that the difference in value-added estimates between the 
complete and incomplete data sets in the random condition is close to zero for much of 
the prior achievement distribution. At the lower end of the distribution (< 250 on the 
scale), we see that the difference increases slightly. Similarly, there is a slight increase in 
the difference in value-added in the 20 percent condition when prior achievement is 
around 375 on the scale. The plot is similar in the highest probability condition, where 
the differences in value-added are close to zero throughout the prior achievement scale 
(Figure 17). In both situations, however, this increase in the difference in value-added 
may represent a relatively small number of classrooms.  
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In the highest achieving condition, differences in value-added are slightly 
negative at the lower end of the prior achievement distribution, and positive at the higher 
end (Figure 18). This can be interpreted to mean that value-added is slightly lower for the 
lower achieving classrooms when a substantial proportion of higher achieving students in 
the top quartile of classrooms opt out. In addition, higher achieving classrooms have 
slightly higher value-added when other higher achieving students opt out.  
In the lowest achieving condition, differences in value-added are fairly consistent 
across the prior achievement scale, which is similar to the random and highest probability 
conditions (Figure 19). Differences are also larger at the tail ends of the achievement 
scale, which is similar to all the other opt out conditions. 
4.5.3 Root Mean Square Difference of Standard Errors 
 
Similar to RMSD’s of the value-added estimates, I calculated the RMSD of the 
standard errors (SE’s) for teacher fixed effects. We see in Table 14 that the RMSD’s of 
standard errors also increase as the magnitude of opt out increases. In each of the opt out 
conditions, average RMSD’s of the standard errors was approximately .003-.004 in the 5 
percent magnitude condition, .005-.006 in the 10 percent condition, and .04 in the 20 
percent condition. While the RMSD of SE’s was fairly consistent across the types of opt 
out, it was slightly higher in the highest achieving condition similar to the RMSD’s of 
value-added estimates.  
In the random and highest probability conditions, the differences in standard 
errors are fairly consistent across the prior achievement scale (Figures 24 and 25). 
However, we see in Figure 26 a substantial increase in standard errors at the high end of 
the prior achievement scale for the highest achieving condition, which occurs in all three 
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magnitude conditions as well. The differences are as large as .08 in the 20 percent 
condition, which represents more than one third of a standard deviation of fixed effects. 
In the lowest achieving condition, we see a slight increase in standard errors at the same 
place in the scale where we saw a significant increase in the percent of opt out, which can 
be interpreted to mean that standard errors increase with large magnitudes of opt out 
(Figure 27). The increase in standard errors here is smaller than in the highest achieving 
condition, at around .035 in the 20 percent condition. 
Classification Agreement: As a final investigation into the stability of the value-
added estimates, I created quartiles of the complete and incomplete fixed effects to 
approximate “effectiveness” categories of teachers. I then calculated the percentage of 
teachers where the complete and incomplete quartile rating were in agreement, and 
averaged that percentage across replications. In Table 14, we see that average 
classification agreement is similar across each of the opt out conditions, and is higher in 
the lower magnitude conditions. For instance, in the 5 percent magnitude condition, we 
see that average classification agreement is 91 percent across all opt out conditions. In the 
20 percent condition, average classification agreement was 80.6 percent in the random 
condition, and drops to 77.7 percent in the highest achieving condition. This can be 
interpreted to mean that an additional 3 percent of teachers would be misclassified with 
this type of nonrandomness present when compared to random opt out. 
 I calculated the average percent of teachers that remained in the same category or 
moved as many as three quartiles up or down, and present this information by prior 
achievement quartile (Tables 15 –18). This is meant to better understand the extent to 
which classification agreement is a function of prior achievement, and to understand just 
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how extensive the moves are across quartiles under each condition. In Table 15, we see 
that average classification agreement in the random condition is similar across prior 
achievement quartiles. In addition, the average number of teachers who move more than 
one quartile is less than one, even in the 20 percent condition. In the highest probability 
condition, the average number of teachers who move more than one category is slightly 
higher – though still less than one across all prior achievement quartiles and magnitude 
conditions (Table 16). The average number of teachers moving two quartiles is highest in 
the bottom two quartiles of prior achievement, at approximately .15 (or .1 percent of 
teachers).  
 In the highest achieving condition, the average number of teachers moving more 
than one category is 1.15 – or .7 percent of teachers – in the top quartile of prior 
achievement (Table 17). The number and percent of teachers moving more than one 
category in the other prior achievement quartiles is close to zero. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, it is the top quartile of prior achievement in all three magnitude conditions 
where we see the highest misclassification when compared with the other three quartiles. 
For instance, in the 20 percent condition, the average number of teachers moving up or 
down one category is approximately 24 (or 10 percent of teachers in the quartile) in the 
bottom three prior achievement quartiles. However, in the top prior achievement quartile, 
the average number of teachers who would change classification is 44 across replications, 
or 26.5 percent of teachers in the quartile.  
In addition, because the percent of opt out is higher for this quartile, there are 
fewer teachers for whom a change can be calculated. We can compare this quartile, 
where approximately 166 of a possible 250 teachers were included in calculations, to the 
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other three quartiles, where an average of 240 teachers were included. This may also 
contribute to the substantial difference in classification agreement for this quartile, 
because teachers whose complete fixed effect was in the top quartile may drop out of the 
analysis in the incomplete condition, which potentially affects the relative place in the 
distribution of fixed effects for other teachers.  
Lastly, to better understand exactly which teachers changed categories, as well as 
why they may have changed, there are two additional visualizations for each opt out 
condition in the 20 percent magnitude condition. Figures 32 –35 show complete and 
incomplete value-added estimates for each opt out condition and for each teacher by their 
change in classification quartile. In all of the figures, we can see two trends across all of 
the opt out conditions. The first is that there is a strong linear relationship between 
complete and incomplete value-added estimates, which we also could have estimated 
given the strong correlations. The second takeaway is that teachers who do change 
quartiles are ones with value-added estimates close to zero. We do not see teachers with 
high value-added estimates changing classification quartiles to a large extent. While some 
teachers may have had value-added estimates change substantially when students opt out, 
they do not necessarily change quartiles.  
The final set of figures (Figures 36 –39) are meant to highlight two points, and 
perhaps makes one point better than the other. The figures show complete value-added 
and average prior achievement by change in quartile, but also includes teachers who were 
excluded from stability analysis. The inclusion of excluded teachers in this figure was 
meant to demonstrate in greater detail just who gets excluded from analysis and its 
potential impact on classification. In the figures, we can see that teachers who change 
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quartiles in the random and highest probability conditions are spread across average prior 
achievement, but have value-added estimates close to zero. However, excluded teachers 
tend to have more spread in value-added estimates, which may, in part, be due to the fact 
that there were already a smaller number of students included in those value-added 
estimates.  
For the highest and lowest-achieving conditions, we see a similar result with 
spread across average prior achievement, as well as value-added estimates close to zero 
for those who change quartiles. However, we see that excluded teachers tend to be 
concentrated at the higher levels of average prior achievement for both opt out 
conditions. As mentioned previously, this certainly could impact classification results, 
where we essentially exclude many teachers with high average prior achievement, which 
changes the relative rank of other teachers across the range.
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which student opt out of 
state assessments used for accountability impacts value-added measures of teacher 
effectiveness. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been a substantial increase in the 
number and proportion of students choosing to forego assessments administered in some 
states, the reasons for which appear to vary across locales. 
No studies to date have asked students directly why they choose to opt out of 
assessments, but Pizmony‐Levy and Green Saraisky (2016) surveyed opt out activists, 
most of whom were parents or teachers. Their study found that most activists advocated 
for students with which they had a personal relationship (i.e. their own children or 
children they taught) because they: a) disagreed with the implementation of Common 
Core State Standards, or b) disagreed with the use of assessments aligned to the Common 
Core for teacher or principal evaluations. A majority of the activists opted their children 
out of the assessments administered in their states, with 63.3 percent reporting they did 
and 93.1 reporting they were “very likely” or “likely” to do so in the future when they 
have a child in a tested grade. The authors also found that activists tended to be white 
women who were relatively wealthier than average, which may be representative of the 
students also choosing to opt out but actually represents a specific subset of the test-
taking population. In New York, the State Education Department found that students wh 
chose to opt out were from wealthier districts, and were slightly more likely to be lower 
achieving than students who chose to take the assessment. Rice, Marland, and Meyer 
(2016) found corroborating results in New York, and added that these opt out students in 
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districts they studied were also slightly more likely to require special educational 
services. In Oregon, opt out students were reported to be wealthier, higher-achieving 
students (Hammond, 2009).  
Given the demographic trends of this phenomenon, it is fair to say that opting out 
is potentially nonrandom, and that students who are no longer included in the test-taking 
population are systematically different. Accepting these facts, one could hypothesize that 
excluding these students from accountability measures (both achievement and growth) 
could potentially affect calculations and the resulting inferences about schools and 
educators. This study specifically focuses on the extent to which growth measures, as 
implemented in a value-added model and used for educator accountability, are impacted 
by nonrandom opt out trends in various magnitudes. In particular, the questions I set out 
to answer were: 
1. What is the impact of opt out on value-added measures? 
a. How does opt out in different magnitudes within a teacher’s classroom 
impact value-added measures?  
b. How do varying degrees of relationship between opt out patterns and prior 
achievement impact value-added measures?   
2. What is the impact of opt out on classification of teachers value-added estimates 
using realistic classification systems? 
This chapter discusses the results from the previous chapter in greater detail. 
Information is presented for each of the four simulated opt out conditions separately. 
First, results for the random condition are presented, including checks on the data 
generation process. Results for the highest probability condition are discussed next, then 
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for the highest achieving condition, and finally, for the lowest achieving condition. 
Within each of the opt out conditions, the impact of varying magnitudes of opt out is 
considered as well. Then, a summary of each of the three nonrandom conditions 
compared with the random condition will be discussed. Finally, implications of the 
results for evaluating teachers, as well as the limitations of this particular study design, is 
discussed.  
5.1 Random Opt Out 
 The random opt out condition was created primarily as a sensitivity check, which 
allowed me to compare the extent to which the simulated nonrandom conditions present 
additional challenges not seen with random opt out. As mentioned, a large degree of 
random opt out could potentially impact the number of teachers receiving value-added 
estimates, as well as potentially impacting the estimates, standard errors, and the 
classification of teachers into effectiveness categories. While I consider random opt out 
in this section, a comparison to random opt out results will also be included in each of the 
following three conditions as well.  
 In general, results from the random opt out condition were expected, and were 
perhaps slightly better than expected. In terms of the data generation process, the percent 
of random opt out was generally in the magnitude category being simulated, and the 
average prior achievement was the same for students chosen for opt out and for those 
who were not. Correlations between average prior achievement and opting out were zero 
at both the student and teacher level.  
The fixed effect distributions were normal, with a mean of 0, a standard deviation 
of .22, and kurtosis of approximately 3. Correlations between value-added estimates from 
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the complete condition and each of the random magnitude conditions (5, 10, and 20 
percent) were at or above .983. The RMSD’s of value-added estimates were lowest in this 
condition, ranging from .019 in the 5 percent magnitude condition to .04 in the 20 percent 
magnitude condition. RMSD of standard errors were also lowest, with a range of .003 in 
the 5 percent condition to .011 in the 20 percent condition. Classification agreement was 
fairly high for the random condition, at 91.1 percent in the 5 percent condition and 80.6 
in the 20 percent. Finally, classification agreement was also relatively similar across each 
of the prior achievement quartiles.  
We can interpret these results to mean that teachers might expect to see slight 
differences in their value-added estimates in states where opt out occurs totally at 
random. In the worst-case scenario (for instance) an average teacher might see his or her 
value-added estimate change by about .18 of a standard deviation if 20 percent of 
students opted out randomly. In addition, using the classification scheme implemented 
here, almost 20 percent of teachers would move up or down one quartile in the 
classification process. Finally, the magnitude of opt out appears to have a substantial 
impact on each of the stability statistics presented here, with higher RMSD’s and lower 
classification agreement as the magnitude of opt out increases.  
5.2 Highest Probability Opt Out 
As mentioned, the relationship between student prior achievement and opting out 
was relatively weak in the year used to generate data for this study. The correlation at the 
student level between prior achievement and opting out in New York State was 
approximately -0.10, and -0.05 at the teacher level. However, the nature of the 
relationship appeared to be nonrandom because the nonzero correlations were negative at 
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both levels. These correlations were used to generate the opt out indicators for the highest 
probability condition – potentially the most realistic condition of the four simulated ones.  
In the highest probability condition, the percent of opt out in teachers’ classrooms 
was also similar to the magnitude being generated. For instance, in the 5 percent 
condition, 48,561 (or 48.6 percent) had between 0 and 10 percent opt out. Average prior 
achievement was about 6 to 7 points lower for opt out students than it was for students 
who did not opt out, which we expect due to the specification of negative correlations. 
Correlations between prior achievement and whether a student opted out were between -
0.05 and -0.07 at the student level, and -0.04 and -0.05 at the teacher level. Correlations 
between value-added and the percent opt out were slightly negative at -0.01 for all 
magnitude conditions.  
Distributional characteristics of value-added estimates were the same as for all the 
other conditions, with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of about .22. Correlations 
between the complete value-added and each of the three magnitudes ranged from .996 in 
the 5 percent condition down to .981 in the 20 percent condition. RMSD’s of the value-
added estimates and standard errors were similar to that of the random condition, though 
slightly higher by approximately .001. Finally, the classification agreement was just 
slightly lower than in the random condition, with 91 percent agreement in the 5 percent 
condition and 80 percent in the 20 percent condition.  
In this study, the highest probability condition mirrored the results of the random 
condition, perhaps because of the relatively weak negative correlations used in the data 
generation process. However, these correlations existed in the empirical data, and so must 
be studied to determine the extent to which they pose a threat to the inferences made in 
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New York State about teachers. Similar to the random condition, the magnitude of opt 
out did have a substantial impact on the the stability statistics used in this study.  
5.3 Highest Achieving Condition 
As of this writing, no other states had provided the same level of information 
about opt out as was provided by New York State. Because of this lack of information, 
two additional conditions, perhaps more extreme than actual situations, were created to 
simulate other possible scenarios. The first scenario is the highest achieving condition, 
where 50 percent of students selected for opt out were from classrooms in the top quartile 
of prior achievement. The remaining 50 percent were selected from the other three 
quartiles of prior achievement at random. This condition led to some interesting 
distributional characteristics in the data generation process, as well as additional 
challenges to the use of value-added estimates.  
In the highest achieving condition, there were substantially more teachers with 
higher levels of opt out for each of the magnitudes when compared with the random 
condition. For instance, more than 12,000 teachers had between 25 and 50 percent opt 
out, and more than 13,000 teachers had more than 50 percent. This phenomenon is likely 
due to the fact that I performed a very targeted selection of opt out students in the 250 
classrooms with the highest prior achievement in each simulation. This also led to the 
highest number of teachers being completely excluded from analysis, with more than 
10,000 dropping out because they had 10 or fewer students included in their value-added 
estimate. Average prior achievement was substantially higher for opt out students, when 
compared with students who did not opt out. The correlation at the student level between 
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prior achievement and opting out ranged from .31 to .39, and between .64 and .74 at the 
teacher level.  
There was slightly more variability in the fixed effects for the highest achieving 
condition, with standard deviations ranging from .23 to .25 (compared with .22 in other 
conditions). Correlations between the complete and incomplete value-added at each of 
the three magnitudes ranged from .995 in the 5 percent condition to .982 in the 20 percent 
condition. RMSD’s of value-added estimates were highest for this condition, ranging 
from .025 to .05. RMSD’s of the standard errors were also double that of the random 
condition, and ranged from .008 to .022. Classification agreement was approximately 
similar to the random condition for the 5 and 10 percent magnitude, but was about 3 
percentage points lower in the 20 percent condition.  
Upon further analyses, we see that teachers in the top quartile of prior 
achievement were the most likely to change effectiveness quartiles. The average percent 
of top quartile teachers changing one quartile was 12 percent in the 5 percent condition, 
and as high as 26.5 percent in the 20 percent condition. This is likely due to the fact that 
most teachers who ultimately get excluded from analysis are those in the top quartile of 
prior achievement, which changes the relative ranking of other teachers.  
The highest achieving condition had what one might consider the most extreme 
results, with the highest RMSD’s of standard errors across replications, as well as the 
lowest classification agreement. As mentioned, this was meant to simulate a situation in 
which the highest achieving students from high achieving classrooms choose to opt out of 
the assessment. The actual implementation of this may not be totally realistic, but it does 
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provide some information about how value-added estimates and classification could 
change as a result of nonrandom opt out of the highest achieving students.  
5.4 Lowest Achieving Condition 
The final simulation was one where the lowest achieving students in the highest 
achieving classrooms choose to opt out of the assessment. Similar to the highest 
achieving condition, 50 percent of opt out students are the lowest achieving in classrooms 
in the top quartile of prior achievement, while the other 50 percent were chosen at 
random across the other three quartiles. 
In terms of the percent of opt out, we saw very similar results to the highest 
achieving condition, with substantially more classrooms with more than 50 percent opt 
out in the 20 percent condition. More than 9,000 teachers were excluded from stability 
analyses because they had 10 or fewer students included in their value-added estimate. 
Average prior achievement was lower for opt out students than for non-opt out students, 
which we would expect. However, the difference between the opt out and non-opt out 
students was not as large in the lowest achieving condition as it was in the highest 
achieving condition. This may be due to the fact that I am selecting the lowest achieving 
students in the top quartile of classrooms, which are not necessarily the lowest achieving 
students in the entire distribution.  
Correlations between prior achievement and opting out ranged from -0.14 to -0.06 
at the student level, and from .45 to .6 at the teacher level. The change in the direction of 
the correlation was meant to mirror what Rice, Marland and Meyer (2016) found in their 
analyses of New York State where the direction changed from student to school or 
district level. The distributional characteristics were similar to those of the other three opt 
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out conditions, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of .22, and correlations 
between complete and incomplete value-added estimates at each magnitude were also 
similar to the other opt out conditions. RMSD of value-added estimates and standard 
errors were also similar to the random and highest probability condition, which were 
lower than what was found in the highest achieving condition.  
Classification agreement in the lowest achieving condition was similar to what 
was found in the highest achieving condition, ranging from 78.6 in the 20 percent 
condition to 91.3 in the 5 percent condition. Also similar to the highest achieving 
condition, agreement was lowest for the classrooms in the top quartile of prior 
achievement. On average, 11.7 of teachers in the top quartile could be expected to change 
one quartile in the 5 percent condition, while 26.3 percent of teachers in the top quartile 
could be expected to change in the 20 percent condition.  
5.5 Implications of Findings 
There are two prominent findings that can help to explain the changes in 
classifications for teachers. The first is that results across opt out conditions were 
relatively similar, with the exception of the 20 percent condition where the standard 
errors were larger and classification agreement lower than for the other three conditions. 
Beyond that, distributional characteristics, correlations between complete and incomplete 
value-added estimates, RMSD’s of the value-added estimates, and even classification 
agreement were, for the most part, fairly similar.  
However, the magnitude of opt out did appear to have a large impact on stability 
statistics, where we saw that RMSD’s of value-added estimates doubled when opt out 
increases from 5 to 20 percent of students choosing to opt out, and nearly tripled for 
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standard errors. Classification agreement dropped 11 - 14 percent from approximately 91 
percent to as low as 77 percent across opt out conditions as well.  
Comparing the results of the lowest achieving condition to each of the other three 
conditions helps to better understand what actually causes the change to classification for 
teachers. The RMSD of the value-added estimates and standard errors for the lowest 
achieving condition were similar to the highest probability and random conditions, while 
the percent opt out and classification agreement are more similar to the highest achieving 
condition.  
In addition, Figures 32 to 39 make two additional points that help to complete the 
picture. First, Figures 32 to 35 shows that there is a strong relationship between value-
added estimates, and that those who change quartiles are closer to zero. Second, Figures 
36 to 39 shows that changes in quartiles were relatively uniform across average prior 
achievement up until the 325 score on the achievement scale. At this point, we see a 
substantial increase in the number of teachers who were excluded from analysis 
completely.  
All of this evidence taken together can be interpreted to mean that the magnitude 
of opt out, in the ways that are simulated, is what causes the change in teacher 
classification. A far more substantial portion of teachers was completely excluded from 
classification in the highest and lowest achieving conditions, which likely caused the 
remaining teachers to change their relative ranking in the distribution of fixed effects.  
5.6 Limitations 
 This is a simulation study, which carries with it some limitations regarding 
generalization to realistic settings. I used empirical data from one state to calculate 
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parameter estimates for the data generation process, but only those parameters were 
controlled in the process. I used the mean scale scores from empirical data, as well 
across-year correlations of scale scores at the student and teacher level, student and 
teacher-level scale score standard deviations, the intraclass correlation (ICC) of opt out 
and scale scores, and the correlation between prior achievement and opting out at the 
teacher and student levels. While this certainly represents many important aspects of 
generating nested classroom scale score data, there are some factors that were not 
controlled. For instance, students in realistic settings are affected by grade-, school- and 
district-level influences as well, which were not included in this study. The ICCs of scale 
scores and percent of opt out were used to represent between classroom differences that 
suggest non-random assignment of students to teachers, but the teacher-level ICC 
neglects school and district-level differences in achievement. Including school and 
district effects might also create more variation in teacher fixed effects generated as part 
of this study, and should be considered in the next round of analysis. 
 In addition, the empirical data used to generate the parameter estimates were a 
sub-sample of the state, and did not fully represent the state as well. Only 37.6 percent of 
students were considered as living in poverty in my sample, where 51.9 percent were 
statewide. This fact may affect the generated parameter estimates somewhat, if students 
living poverty tend to have different growth trajectories than those who do not (which is 
the case in other locales).  
 Relatedly, as of this writing, no other states have published parameter estimates 
from which I could conduct a similar study to what was done for New York. Because of 
the lack of information, the highest and lowest achieving conditions are somewhat 
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manufactured. These two conditions were meant to mirror situations that were 
conceptually similar, but it is impossible to know whether the conditions I created are 
close to, or far from, the realities in those locales.  
 In addition, the standard deviation of value-added estimates were approximately 
.22 - .24, where in empirical data they tend to be between .25 - .35. As mentioned, this 
may be due, in part, to not including between-school and district differences in 
achievement in the data generation process.  
5.7 Conclusion  
This study has several implications for states and districts where opt out is non-
negligible for several reasons.  The first is that states put these growth measures in place 
to hold teachers, schools, and districts accountable for improving student learning, and 
ultimately, many are not accountable because of a reduced number of students eligible for 
inclusion in value-added estimates – while at the same time, they may have encouraged 
students to opt out from the assessment. This brings forward the second implication. 
The choice by these educators impacts their colleagues as well if states employ a 
normative classification scheme, where the place in the distribution of fixed effects 
ultimately determines a teacher’s classification. If opt out trends continue, states and 
districts may find a criterion-referenced classification preferable, where value-added 
thresholds are used to classify teachers into effectiveness categories. As seen in the 
literature, this requires experts to determine what qualifies as low, average, and high 
growth. However, a criterion-reference system may be preferable to a system where 
teachers are more likely to change classifications because of another teacher’s behavior.  
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States and districts should consider standard errors when classifying teachers into 
effectiveness categories. As seen in the analyses, standard errors increase substantially 
when there are large degrees of opt out in a teacher’s classroom, which diminishes one’s 
ability to interpret the estimate with any degree of confidence. Some states, including 
New York, already use a confidence interval when classifying teachers. However, they 
also use a normative approach to classification.  
Opt out in large magnitudes, like in New York and other states, causes 
downstream effects related to data availability as well. With respect to achievement 
measures, students who are excluded from analysis this year cannot be included in 
calculating the percent of students meeting the grade-level proficiency standards. While 
the percent meeting grade-level standards may be an accurate measure of those included 
in the analysis, it may not be accurate for all students in a school or district if opt out 
students represent a systematically different sample. That is to say that the percent may 
be higher or lower if opt out students participated in the assessment. In addition, in 
subsequent years, calculating adequate yearly progress could be biased if some previous 
opt out students choose to participate, or if new students choose to do so in a nonrandom 
manner. For instance, if opt out becomes more nonrandom, the calculation of the change 
in the percent of students meeting standards may be incomparable because the two 
groups are no longer similar to each other.  
With respect to growth measures, in addition to the issues mentioned above, one 
additional downstream effect is that opt out students this year likely cannot be included in 
growth measures next year. All growth models require a baseline score from which to 
calculate change, which becomes much more difficult for students who choose to opt out. 
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There is a future line of inquiry related to utilizing multiple imputation of missing prior 
year scores, or in using prior scores from two years prior as a baseline; however, both of 
those introduce a new set of issues. As mentioned, multiple imputation requires 
acknowledging variability due to sampling error, which may be problematic to those 
being evaluated using these scores. The two-year lag correlation is also slightly lower 
than a one-year lag, which introduces additional uncertainty into value-added estimation. 
Both methods assume that students who opt out this year eventually participate in 
assessments in future years, which also needs to be investigated. It is possible that 
students who choose to opt out this year will continue to do so in future years, or that 
they may return to the data. This question is easily answered, now that states have several 
years of data where opt out has been seen in non-negligible magnitudes. 
 States with large proportions of opt out, regardless of the type, should consider 
ways to adjust for the resulting differences in value-added estimates outlined here. The 
best case scenario for a state in this study was that 20 percent of teachers move one 
quartile when 20 percent of students opt out. Teachers who moved were primarily in the 
middle two quartiles, but it is possible that some could end up in a quartile of 
consequence. Given that, states might consider the amount of opt out in a teacher’s 
classroom when creating a rating for them. For instance, a teacher with no opt out who 
moves into a quartile of consequence might be “held to no harm” as a result of the large 
degree of opt out elsewhere.  
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Table 1: Percent of Opt Out by State from Bennett (2016) 
 
State ELA Math Overall 
California     3% 
Idaho     2% 
Connecticut     4% 
Washington 2% 3%   
Maine 5% 6%   
Colorado 11% 10%   
Rhode Island 12% 10%   
New York     20% 
 
 
Table 2: Number and Percent of Teachers with Varying Levels of Non-Participation on 
the State Assessment (NYSED, 2015) 
 
  
Number 
of 
Teachers 
Percent 
of 
Teachers 
Teachers with exactly 0% non-participation 7,005 19.59 
Teachers with more than 0% and less than 10% non-
participation 
10,688 29.89 
Teachers with 10% to 25% non-participation 6,551 18.32 
Teachers with 25% to 50% non-participation 7,831 21.9 
Teachers with 50% or more non-participation 3,680 10.29 
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Table 3:Descriptive Statistics for 6th Grade Math in Sample and Statewide 
 
  Sample Statewide 
Number of Opt Out Students 1,563 47,177 
Number of Participating Students 6,460 141,167 
Total Enrolled 8,023 188,344 
% of Opt Out 0.19 0.25 
S.D. of Opting Out 0.4 n/a 
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Table 4: Number and Percent of Teachers in Each Opt Out Category by Magnitude: Random Condition 
 
 Random 
 5%  10%  20%  
 N % N % N % 
0 percent 24,683 24.7 7,360 7.4 1,084 1.1 
> 0 percent & <= 10 percent 64,170 64.2 47,539 47.5 8,809 8.8 
> 10 percent & <= 25 percent 11,037 11.0 43,833 43.8 67,494 67.5 
> 25 percent & <= 50 percent 103 0.1 1,235 1.2 22,524 22.5 
> 50 percent 7 0.0 33 0.0 89 0.1 
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Table 5: Number and Percent of Teachers in Each Opt Out Category by Magnitude: Highest Probability Condition 
 Highest Probability 
 5%  10%  20%  
 N % N % N % 
0 percent 36,014 36.0 16,203 16.2 4,151 4.2 
> 0 percent & <= 10 percent 48,561 48.6 43,713 43.7 20,279 20.3 
> 10 percent & <= 25 percent 14,436 14.4 33,972 34.0 46,055 46.1 
> 25 percent & <= 50 percent 975 1.0 5,962 6.0 27,471 27.5 
> 50 percent 14 0.0 150 0.2 2,044 2.0 
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Table 6: Number and Percent of Teachers in Each Opt Out Category by Magnitude: Highest Achieving Condition 
 Highest Achieving 
 5%  10%  20%  
 N % N % N % 
0 percent 37,423 37.4 18,293 18.3 5,507 5.5 
> 0 percent & <= 10 percent 44,253 44.3 49,523 49.5 35,495 35.5 
> 10 percent & <= 25 percent 15,267 15.3 21,888 21.9 32,975 33.0 
> 25 percent & <= 50 percent 2,943 2.9 9,504 9.5 12,248 12.2 
> 50 percent 114 0.1 792 0.8 13,775 13.8 
 
 
  
90 
 
Table 7: Number and Percent of Teachers in Each Opt Out Category by Magnitude: Lowest Achieving Condition 
 Lowest Achieving 
 5%  10%  20%  
 N % N % N % 
0 percent 37,729 37.7 18,428 18.4 5,526 5.5 
> 0 percent & <= 10 percent 42,656 42.7 50,129 50.1 35,522 35.5 
> 10 percent & <= 25 percent 17,566 17.6 18,645 18.6 33,822 33.8 
> 25 percent & <= 50 percent 2,044 2.0 12,765 12.8 10,860 10.9 
> 50 percent 5 0.0 33 0.0 14,270 14.3 
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Table 8: Number and Percent of Teachers with Exactly Zero Students in Each Condition and Magnitude 
 
 Random Highest Probability Highest Achieving Lowest Achieving 
Magnitude N % N % N % N % 
5% 5 0.005 5 0.005 11 0.011 4 0.004 
10% 25 0.025 29 0.030 43 0.040 9 0.009 
20% 5 0.005 5 0.005 37 0.037 6 0.006 
 
 
 
Table 9: Number and Percent of Teachers with 10 or Fewer Students Included in Value-Added Estimates in Each Condition 
and Magnitude 
  Complete VA Random 
Highest 
Probability 
Highest 
Achieving Lowest Achieving 
Magnitude N % N % N % N % N % 
5% 1,900 1.9 2,687 2.7 2,734 2.7 2,941 2.9 2,822 2.8 
10% 2,300 2.3 3,144 3.1 3,318 3.3 3,631 3.6 3,461 3.5 
20% 1,900 1.9 5,229 5.2 5,980 6.0 10,551 10.6 9,349 9.3 
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Table 10: Average Student-Level Prior Achievement by Opt Out Status, Opt Out Condition, and Magnitude 
    Average Prior Achievement  
Condition Magnitude Opt Out Not Opt Out 
Random 
5% 310 310 
10% 310 310 
20% 310 310 
Highest Probability 
5% 303 310 
10% 304 311 
20% 305 311 
Highest Achieving 
5% 355 307 
10% 346 306 
20% 336 303 
Lowest Achieving 
5% 290 311 
10% 296 311 
20% 306 311 
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Table 11: Student- and Teacher-Level Correlations Between Prior Achievement/Value-Added and Opt Out 
    Random Opt Out 
Highest 
Probability Highest Achieving Lowest Achieving 
    Student Teacher Student Teacher Student Teacher Student Teacher 
Prior 
Achievement 
5% 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.31 0.64 -0.14 0.45 
10% 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.34 0.68 -0.13 0.50 
20% 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.39 0.74 -0.06 0.60 
Value-
Added 
5%   0.00   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01 
10%   0.00   -0.01   -0.02   -0.02 
20%   0.00   -0.01   -0.02   -0.02 
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Table 12: Distributional Descriptive Statistics for Value-Added Estimates by Condition and Magnitude 
    Complete 
Random 
Opt Out 
Highest 
Probability 
Highest 
Achieving 
Lowest 
Achieving 
Mean 
5% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard 
Deviation 
5% 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 
10% 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.22 
20% 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.22 
Kurtosis 
5% 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.03 3.02 
10% 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 
20% 3.01 3.00 3.01 3.00 3.01 
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Table 13: Correlations Between Complete and Incomplete Value-Added Estimates from Each Condition and Magnitude 
  5% 10% 20% 
Random 0.996 0.992 0.983 
Highest Probability 0.996 0.991 0.981 
Highest Achieving 0.995 0.991 0.982 
Lowest Achieving 0.996 0.991 0.981 
 
 
 
96 
 
Table 14: Stability Statistics for Value-Added Estimates for Each Condition and Magnitude 
    Random 
Highest 
Probability 
Highest 
Achieving 
Lowest 
Achieving 
RMSD - VA 
5% 0.019 0.020 0.025 0.021 
10% 0.028 0.029 0.035 0.029 
20% 0.042 0.043 0.050 0.043 
RMSD - SE 
5% 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.004 
10% 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.007 
20% 0.011 0.012 0.022 0.014 
Classification 
Agreement 
5% 91.1 91.0 91.1 91.3 
10% 87.4 87.3 87.8 88.0 
20% 80.6 80.0 77.7 78.6 
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Table 15:Average Number and Percent of Teachers Who Change Rating Categories by Prior Achievement: Random Condition 
    Random 
  Prior 
Achievement 
Quartile 
No Change +/-1 Category 
+/-2 
Categories 
+/-3 
Categories 
Magnitude N % N % N % N % 
5% 
1 - Bottom 226.91 93.7 15.25 6.3 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 228.20 93.5 15.85 6.5 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 228.56 93.7 15.34 6.3 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 227.62 93.7 15.40 6.3 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
10% 
1 - Bottom 217.66 90.2 23.64 9.8 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 220.09 90.5 23.02 9.5 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 218.71 90.0 24.24 10.0 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 217.69 90.3 23.49 9.7 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
20% 
1 - Bottom 200.03 84.8 35.85 15.2 0.03 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 201.92 84.9 35.97 15.1 0.03 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 202.70 85.2 35.18 14.8 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 201.69 85.5 34.27 14.5 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 
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Table 16: Average Number and Percent of Teachers Who Change Rating Categories by Prior Achievement: Highest 
Probability Condition 
    Highest Probability 
  Prior 
Achievement 
Quartile 
No Change +/-1 Category 
+/-2 
Categories 
+/-3 
Categories 
Magnitude N % N % N % N % 
5% 
1 - Bottom 225.38 93.1 16.58 6.9 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 227.43 93.3 16.21 6.7 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 228.28 93.6 15.69 6.4 0.03 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 228.67 94.1 14.38 5.9 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
10% 
1 - Bottom 216.12 89.8 24.48 10.2 0.04 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 219.29 90.3 23.42 9.6 0.06 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 219.37 90.4 23.42 9.6 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 218.03 90.6 22.54 9.4 0.05 0.0 0.00 0.0 
20% 
1 - Bottom 196.91 84.5 35.99 15.4 0.15 0.1 0.00 0.0 
2 200.97 85.1 34.97 14.8 0.15 0.1 0.00 0.0 
3 201.52 85.3 34.64 14.7 0.07 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 200.60 85.4 34.14 14.5 0.09 0.0 0.00 0.0 
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Table 17: Average Number and Percent of Teachers Who Change Rating Categories by Prior Achievement: Highest Achieving 
Condition 
    Highest Achieving 
  Prior 
Achievement 
Quartile 
No Change +/-1 Category 
+/-2 
Categories 
+/-3 
Categories 
Magnitude N % N % N % N % 
5% 
1 - Bottom 233.38 95.9 9.86 4.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 234.81 95.9 10.12 4.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 234.68 95.8 10.18 4.2 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 208.56 87.8 28.94 12.2 0.06 0.0 0.00 0.0 
10% 
1 - Bottom 226.85 93.6 15.56 6.4 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 229.24 93.7 15.29 6.3 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 228.32 93.4 16.02 6.6 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 193.50 83.3 38.82 16.7 0.09 0.0 0.00 0.0 
20% 
1 - Bottom 217.60 90.2 23.76 9.8 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 218.39 89.8 24.65 10.1 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 218.51 90.1 23.91 9.9 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 122.07 72.8 44.42 26.5 1.15 0.7 0.00 0.0 
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Table 18: Average Number and Percent of Teachers Who Change Rating Categories by Prior Achievement: Lowest Achieving 
Condition 
    Lowest Achieving 
  Prior 
Achievement 
Quartile 
No Change +/-1 Category 
+/-2 
Categories 
+/-3 
Categories 
Magnitude N % N % N % N % 
5% 
1 - Bottom 233.22 95.9 10.05 4.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 234.93 95.9 9.95 4.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 234.51 95.8 10.36 4.2 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 210.82 88.3 27.93 11.7 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 
10% 
1 - Bottom 227.49 93.8 15.07 6.2 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 229.05 93.8 15.23 6.2 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 228.17 93.4 16.01 6.6 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 195.51 83.4 38.71 16.5 0.15 0.1 0.00 0.0 
20% 
1 - Bottom 217.27 90.1 23.85 9.9 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 
2 219.36 90.3 23.62 9.7 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 
3 217.55 90.1 23.96 9.9 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 
4 - Top 131.93 72.9 47.57 26.3 1.35 0.7 0.01 0.0 
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Figure 1: Missing Completely at Random 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Missing at Random 
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Figure 3: Missing Not at Random 
 
 
 
Figure 4:Distribution of Percent Opt Out in Each Classroom for Random Condition 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Percent Opt Out in Each Classroom for Highest Probability 
Condition 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Percent Opt Out in Each Classroom for Highest Achieving 
Condition 
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Figure 7: Distribution of Percent Opt Out in Each Classroom for Lowest Achieving 
Condition 
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Figure 8: Distribution of Prior Achievement by Opt Out Status: Random Condition 
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Figure 9: Distribution of Prior Achievement by Opt Out Status: Highest Probability 
Condition 
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Figure 10: Distribution of Prior Achievement by Opt Out Status: Highest Achieving 
Condition 
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Figure 11: Distribution of Prior Achievement by Opt Out Status: Lowest Achieving 
Condition 
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Figure 12: Percent of Opt Out by Average Prior Achievement: Random Condition 
(mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 13: Percent of Opt Out by Average Prior Achievement: Highest Probability 
Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 14: Percent of Opt Out by Average Prior Achievement: Highest Achieving 
Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 15: Percent of Opt Out by Average Prior Achievement: Lowest Achieving 
Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 16: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Prior Achievement: 
Random Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 17: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Prior Achievement: 
Highest Probability Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 18: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Prior Achievement: 
Highest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 19: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Prior Achievement: 
Lowest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 20: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Percent Opt Out: 
Random Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
 
 
119 
 
 
Figure 21: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Percent Opt Out: 
Highest Probability Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 22: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Percent Opt Out: 
Highest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 23: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Estimates by Percent Opt out: 
Lowest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 24: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Prior 
Achievement: Random Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 25: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Prior 
Achievement: Highest Probability Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
 
 
 
124 
 
 
Figure 26: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Prior 
Achievement: Highest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 27: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Prior 
Achievement: Lowest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 28: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Percent Opt 
Out: Random Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 29: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Percent Opt 
Out: Highest Probability Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 30: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Percent Opt 
Out: Highest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 31: Difference in Complete and Incomplete VA Standard Errors by Percent Opt 
Out: Lowest Achieving Condition (mspline smoothing, bands = 25) 
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Figure 32: Change in Value-Added Quartile by Complete and Incomplete VA in 20 
percent Random Condition 
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Figure 33: Change in VA Quartile by Complete and Incomplete VA in 20 Percent 
Highest Probability Condition 
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Figure 34: Change in VA Quartile by Complete and Incomplete VA in 20 Percent 
Highest Achieving Condition 
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Figure 35: Change in VA Quartile by Complete and Incomplete VA in 20 Percent 
Highest Achieving Condition 
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Figure 36: Change in VA Quartile by Complete VA and Average Prior Achievement in 
20 Percent Random Condition 
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Figure 37: Change in VA Quartile by Complete VA and Average Prior Achievement in 
20 Percent Highest Probability Condition 
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Figure 38: Change in VA Quartile by Complete VA and Average Prior Achievement in 
20 Percent Highest Achieving Condition 
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Figure 39: Change in VA Quartile by Complete VA and Average Prior Achievement in 
20 Percent Lowest Achieving Condition 
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